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Britain and France are currently modernizing and
expanding their nuclear arsenals. This thesis examines the
current British and French strategic nuclear force
modernization programs and weapon systems. It specifies the
important differences between the two nations with regard to
strategic rationales for nuclear forces and nuclear
targeting. It includes an analysis of several additional
factors affecting their respective modernization programs,
including alternative options considered, domestic politics,
technology, national economies, defense spending, and
American co-operation. After examining these modernizations
within the context of the past and present development of
British and French deterrence and strategic nuclear
policies, the thesis suggests implications for British and
French nuclear programs and strategy for the next decade and
into the twenty-first century.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND ANALYTICAL PURPOSES
Britain and France are currently modernizing and
expanding their strategic nuclear arsenals. According to
some accounts, when the currently envisaged modernizations
are completed in the year 2005, British and French strategic
forces will not only be more accurate but will have seven
times the number of warheads at their disposal today (in
December 1989) [Ref. l:p. 13. These modernization programs
have a number of implications for present and future U.S.
defense planning. These modernization programs will affect
not only the nature and composition of the Western nuclear
deterrent but also the size and strength of West European
conventional defenses. The most important question concerns
the deterrent postures of these two West European allies,
one of which remains fully within the integrated military
structure of NATO, while the other continues to follow an
independent nuclear path. Furthermore, the programs may
Influence the future role of the United States in the
Atlantic Alliance. By examining the modernization programs
within the context of the historical development of British
and French strategic nuclear deterrence policies, this
thesis will explore the possible courses for British and
French nuclear strategy for the next decade and into the
twenty-first century.
At first glance it appears reasonable to consider the
French and British nuclear forces as categorically similar:
independent strategic nuclear deterrent forces, comparable
in weapon systems composition, development, and deterrence
theory rationale. In fact, such a Judgement is superficial
and far from the truth. British and French strategic
nuclear capabilities, doctrinal developments, political
objectives, and policy determinants (including co-ordination
with allies) differ in substantial and noteworthy respects.
This thesis examines the current British and French
strategic nuclear force modernization programs and specifies
the important differences between these two nations with
regard to nuclear weapons issues and nuclear deterrence
policy. The study of the rationales behind these program
developments in the thesis identifies distinct differences
in the British and French outlooks on the changing
international environment, their future geopolitical
positions and roles, their threat perceptions, the evolution
of their nuclear doctrines, and their specific internal
domestic constraints. This review of the British and French
nuclear modernization programs provides a basis for
Judgments about these nuclear force postures in next decade
and the early twenty-first century.
A complete historical review and analysis of British and
French nuclear policy development and force deployments is
beyond the scope of this work. However, a focus on their
modernization programs permits emphasis on current issues
and debates, as well as bringing to the surface past
rationales, policy decisions, and doctrinal developments
that have led to the present programs.
The United Kingdom-'s Trident program will be considered
first. Discussion began in the late 1970s in Britain over a
replacement for the aging Polaris force. Some circles
advocated the curtailment of Britain's nuclear deterrence
capability altogether and suggested other programs on which
the money could be usefully spent. However, on 15 July 1980
the Thatcher government announced its intention to build
four new submarines, each carrying 16 American Trident I C-4
missiles, as a replacement for Polaris. Following the U.S.
Government's October 1981 decision to accelerate Trident II
D-5 development, the U.S. -British agreement was renegotiated
and the British government announced in March 1982 that the
Polaris system would be replaced by the Trident II D-5
program. The Trident II D-5 missile represents over a 250
percent increase in missile range and hence increased
target coverage. The British government has also
acknowledged that a single Trident vessel could threaten up
to 128 targets with 128 weapons compared to two Polaris
boats which could threaten a maximum of 32 targets with 96
warheads CRef. 2:p. 120],
The increased striking capability of the Trident system
has already created political concerns in Britain which have
in turn altered policy. Although the D-5 missile is capable
of carrying 14 MIRV (multiple independently targeted reentry
vehicle) warheads, the actual number to be carried in U.K.
service is classified. Apparently because of a wish to
convey an image of moderation in pursuing a strategy of
minimum deterrence (i.e., that Britain is not speeding up
the "arms race" or seeking a "war fighting" capability) the
British government indicated that it will not use the full
capacity, and that each submarine will carry no more than
the number of warheads (128 warheads) that would have been
deployed if the Trident I C-4 missile (8 warheads) had been
instal led.
However, some strategic questions remain unanswered.
What will be the strategic roles of Trident? How will the
more widespread, flexible, and selective targeting
capability be employed and incorporated in NATO planning?
How credible is the policy assertion that Britain maintains
a minimum deterrent force, in view of Trident^s increased
capaci ties?
The major change brought about by French strategic
modernization is the expansion of striking power in the
SSBN (nuclear ballistic missile submarine) fleet. The
deployment of missiles with multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles on most of their SSBNs, the M-4
retrofit program, will increase by a factor of five the
number of warheads carried by the SSBN fleet. There are
also plans (temporarily postponed) to develop and deploy the
S-4, a land-based, intermediate-range ballistic missile of
2,000 to 4,000 kilometer range capable of reaching targets
in the Soviet Union. In addition 18 Mirage IVs will be
fitted with ASMP (Air-Sol Moyenne Portee) medium-range air
to ground missiles with increased standoff capability. The
French strategic system improvements will enhance the
survivability of the French deterrent posture as well as
greatly expand its striking power.
What does this imply for the traditional French
declaratory policy of proportional deterrence strategy and
autonomy in defense matters? The French already talk of an
"enlarged anti-cities" strategy. With an increase in the
number of survivable warheads and more efficient target
coverage, a wider range of multiple strike options will
become possible. Could this suggest the emergence of a
French strategy of flexible response, the NATO strategy
which the French currently reject? Could the capability of
limited strikes, made possible through the modernization
programs, undermine the credibility of deterrence by the
weak of the strong?
There are significant differences in the reasons for
modernization in the two countries. In the case of Britain,
the policy rationale relies heavily on Britain's
contribution and commitment to NATO's strategy of nuclear
deterrence. The Ministry of Defence Open Government
Document 80/23, The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear
Deterrent Force , which outlined the modernization program,
reveals Britain's commitment and unique contribution to
NATO's strategy of deterrence and the value that the
government placed on Anglo-American co-operation. The
arguments against the Trident I and II decisions raised by
the government's critics reflect the political and social
environment in which nuclear weapons issues and roles are
decided in Britain. For example, some critics view the
continued Anglo-American nuclear co-operation as a political
liability in Britain's relations with Europe. In 1982
British politics were so polarized over the Thatcher
government's decision to develop a new generation of
independent deterrent means based on nuclear submarines that
the Labour, Liberal, and Social Democratic parties withdrew
their support for the Trident II program. The options which
were available but not selected (such as a land-based system
instead of a submarine launch platform or a cruise instead
of a ballistic missile delivery vehicle) revealed a great
deal about the roles assigned to nuclear weapons in British
defense policy as well as about British political and fiscal
constraints.
French modernization efforts are rooted in different
factors. Improvements in technology have permitted the
French to fit their submarines with multiple warhead
missiles as well as to improve the range and accuracy of the
missiles and the penetration capability of the warheads.
Also, the French nuclear effort has been useful in gaining
broad popular domestic support for France's overall defense
posture, for it has been seen as the linchpin in maintaining
the independence of French security policy. Because French
public opinion, nuclear weapons, and independence are
intertwined, it is necessary to keep nuclear force
modernization a high political priority. By modernizing,
the French also seek to deter Soviet coercion and/or
aggression. Doctrinal statements indicate that the French
are seeking an ability to target the infrastructure of the
Soviet economy and administration rather than simply
population centers.
The analytical review of British and French strategic
nuclear force modernization programs and strategies in this
thesis Is intended to fulfill the following objectives:
1. By understanding current and proposed modernization
programs in Britain and France, to enable the
defense planner to forecast better the nuclear
balance of forces in Europe through the next decade.
2. To analyze the publicly proposed strategies for
employment of these new weapons systems for
compatibility between official stated policy and
actual hardware capabilities.
3. To draw conclusions regarding strategic Implications
for these countri.es and NATO as a whole.
4. To improve the defense planner^s contextual
understanding of the countries involved and to
provide insight into some of the political, social,
and economic dynamics that affect the national
nuclear planning processes and the force postures.
5. Through a better contextual understanding of the
countries involved and a knowledge of what weapon
systems they are developing and deploying, to aid
the defense planner in anticipating British and
French government policies as well as their probable
reactions toward potential American initiatives in
the nuclear arena.
6. By examination of the modernization programs, to
reveal several important differences in the nuclear
capabilities and policies of Britain and France,
thereby providing a richer analysis than one that
would collectively categorize Britain and France as
essentially identical "medium" nuclear powers.
B. METHODOLOGY
A comparative analysis methodology will be employed.
The weapon system programs under development and in
deployment stages along with details of the hardware and
weapon system capabilities are examined in Chapter II.
Chapter III considers the strategic rationales behind both
nuclear forces and reviews the unclassified literature
concerning British and French nuclear targeting. This
chapter includes a discussion of the implications for change
in strategic doctrine and targeting options afforded by the
British and French arsenal upgrades. Additional factors
affecting the modernization programs are examined in Chapter
IV. The factors considered include alternative options that
the two nations considered for modernization in the 1980s
and 1990s, British and French domestic politics and the
nuclear modernization issues, economic bases and technology
capabilities, and perspectives concerning American
co-operation. Chapter V offers an analytical comparison of
the two national modernization programs and strategies, and
contrasts the implications and perspectives regarding the
foreign and domestic environment. Conclusions and findings
are also summarized.
II. MODERNIZATION PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS
A. BRITAIN
1. Polaris/Cheval ine
The current British strategic nuclear deterrent
force consists of four submarines of the 8,500 ton
Resolut ion class which entered service between October 1967
and December 1969 ( HMS Resolution . October 1967; HMS
Repulse . September 1968; HMS Renown, November 1968; and HMS
Revenge . 1969). Since early 1969 one has always been on
patrol and available for operational employment. Currently
HMS Renown is in a long refit and will be followed by HMS
Revenge . whose third long refit will begin in 1990 [Ref.
3:p. x]. No fourth refit is planned for HMS Resolut ion or
any other Polaris boat, although the option will remain open
for the next few years. The Ministry of Defence has
ackowledged the risk of reduced deterrent capability in this
plan should there be a "major reduction in SSBN availability
due to an unforeseen emergency (e.g., an accident, or
significant delay to SSBN 05 or 06 [ Vanguard or Victorious ]
;
or a loss of a Polaris submarine)." [Ref. 3:p. xvi]
Each SSBN can carry 16 Aerojet/Hercules Polaris A3
two-stage solid-fuel SLBMs (submar i ne- 1 aunched ballistic
missiles) with inertial navigation and a range of 2,500
nautical miles. Although capable of carrying three 200
10
<iloton MRv warheaas [Ref. 4:p. 263. the Chevalme aesign
may. according to some speculation. carry six re-entry
vehicles of 40 kilotons each of either the MRV (multiple
re-entry vehicles) or MIRV (multiple independently targeted
re-entry vehicles) variety [Ref. 2:p. 20]. Even though the
British government has not made such information publicly
availaoie, the Polaris stockpile is reported by one account
to oe 70 missiles and 45-50 warheads [Ref. 5:p. 648 3. In
1978. however. the U.S. Department of Defense Security
Assistance Agency announced in its publication Foreign
Ml 1 1 larv Sa ; es arc K i 1 1 1 a r v Assi stance Facts that a Britisr.
order for 31 Polaris missiles had been approved for delivery
in tne 1980s. in addition to the 102 Polaris missiles
alreaay aeliverea [Ref. 3:p. xvii].
unti. zne principal British modernization program
(Triaen:) becomes operational, Britain will remain aependent
upon tne Polaris fleet for its inoependent strategic nuclear
deterrent. Two programs have recently oeen completed to
miaintain this capability into the 1990s--the purchase of new
rocKet motors for the missiles from tne Unitea States and
the development of a new front-eno for the missiles
(Cnevaiine). After refit schedules between 1982 and 1988
all four Polaris SSBNs are now able to patrol with a full
load of Cheva 1 1 ne-t ipped Polaris missiles.
The Conservative government aecided to develop the
Cheval ine upgrade to the Polaris A3 missiles in 1972
following the signing of the ABM Treaty between the United
States and Soviet Union. This decision was also confirmed
by the Labour government when it came to power in 1974.
With an assurance that the Soviets would not significantly
improve their anti-ballistic missile defenses (or at least
remain limited to 100 launchers around Moscow), the British
government felt confident in pursuing an expensive
unilateral project to upgrade the penetrating capabilities
of its missiles. Chevaline has been described as two
maneuvering clusters of real warheads and decoys, capable of
penetrating Moscow defenses [Ref. 6:p. 933. This was done
by developing a sophisticated liquid-fueled post-boost
vehicle capable of maneuvering deep in space
( exoatmospher i c ) to confuse enemy radars as it descends
toward earth [Ref. 2:p. 201. The concept was to rain a
series of warheads and decoys simultaneously over target
areas to swamp the defenses. However, one expert on British
targeting suggested that the effects come not from the
contents of a single missile but from the combined contents
of a number of missiles, possibly the complement of one SSBN
[Ref. 6:p. 93].
There have been inconsistent statements and
speculations regarding the MRV or MIRV capability of the
Cheveline re-entry vehicles. One former British official
acknowledged reports indicating that the system was of the
MRV design vice MIRV type [Ref. 4:p. 26]. This raises the
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issue of limited flexibility and probable difficulty in
attacking many targets. One published source indicated that
Cheveline re-entry vehicles did not increase the yield of
the Polaris missiles and that the warheads are said to be
capable of separation between impact points of a maximum of
70 kilometers [Ref. 7:p. 211. On the other hand, some
senior British officials involved with the program suggested
that it did have a smaller number of larger yields warheads
with MIRV qualities [Ref. 2:p. 213. However, it is noted
that most observers do not attribute MIRV capability to
Cheva line.
2. Trident II D-5
On 15 July 1980 the British government announced its
intention to build four new submarines, each equipped with
16 Trident I missiles as a replacement for the Polaris
fleet. The fact that the Government did not commit to five
SSBNs surprised some since operational experience with
Polaris had shown it incapable of keeping two SSBNs on
continuous patrol, but the Thatcher government played down
the urgency of procuring a fifth boat. For one thing the
new Rolls-Royce PWR-2 reactor could operate longer between
refits. Secondly, even if only one British Trident SSBN
were on patrol during hostilities, it was argued that a
single Trident vessel could threaten up to 128 targets with
128 weapons compared to two Polaris boats which could
13
threaten a maximum of 32 targets with 96 warheads. CRef.
2:p. 120 3
But the procurement question was not settled.
Following the U.S. Government's October 1981 decision to
proceed with Trident II D-5 development, the Reagan
administration proved even more co-operative in contract
negotiations than the Carter administration. The 1963
Polaris Sales Agreement framework was retained allowing
Britain to purchase the missiles, complete with multiple
independently targetaDle re-entry vehicles out without the
warheacs tnemseives. at U.S. Navy unit costs; the British
research and development contrioution was fixed in real
terms at Si 16 million, rather than 5 percent over cost of
the missile as under the Trident I agreement, since
development costs were uncertain at tne time [Ref. 2: pp.
118, 121: Ref. 8:p. 204]. The U.S. Government also
suspended the "Buy American Act" to allow British firms to
compete for subcontracts on the production run [Ref. 8:p.
204]. With these favorable terms tne Britisn government
announced on 11 March i'582 the decision to buy the Trident
II D-5 strategic weapon system.
In January 1989 the Secretary of State for Defence
announced a revised estimate for the cost of the Trident
program of £9,089 million at 1988-89 prices, covering a
period of expenditure from 1980 to 2000 [Ref. 3:p. v].
Including the savings that resulted from the 1982 decision
to refuTDisn ihe missiles at the U.S. facility at King's
Bay, Georgia, rather tnan at the Royal Naval Armaments Depot
at Couiport, Scotiand, the present estimate is approximately
17 percent lower tnan the 1981 estimate [Ref. 3:p. v].
There has oeen a continuing tendency over the past three
years for tne estimate to fall in real terms.
Most of the savings have been on expenditure
expected to oe incurred in the United States. Estimated
expenaiture in the U.S. on the missiles is now only 61
percent of tne 1=^81 estimate and the expected cost of the
strategic weapons system equipment is now only 69 percent of
the 198: estimate. In the United Kingdom part of tne
program, the m.ain savings have been in the cost of the
submarines, wnere estimiateo expenditure is 79 percent of the
1^81 estimate. [Ref. 3:p. viij
By December 1988 some 44 percent of the total
Trioent .program b'>.aget nad oeen committed and nearly a
quarter of tne total hac oeen spent. By the end of tne
1988-8-^ fiscal year. expenditure was expected to have
tctoiec £2,3CC miiiion. Annual expenoiture will oe £938
million in 1989-90: ana in 1990-91 it will reach its peak at
£1,025 million ana then the rate of expenditure will decline
gradually. [Ref. 3:p. viij
Tne first two suomarines of tne 15,000 ton
V a n Q u a r Q class are unaer construction at Vickers
Snipco . : Cx ng ana Zngmeering Limited. ( HMS Vanguard was laid
15
3 September 1986; and HMS Victorious was laid 3 December
1987.) Orders for the remaining two boats ( HMS Vengeance .
HMS Venerable ) are expected by the end of 1989 [Ref. 9:p.
24]. Although the actual in-service date for the first of
the Trident boats remains classified, the British Ministry
of Defence has consistently given the in-service date for
Trident as the mid-1990s. However, Prime Minister Thatcher
was more specific when she gave a date of 1994 at a news
conference following the March 1988 NATO Summit [Ref. 10:p.
xxvi]. In general, the British press and open source
literature refer to this latter date. Despite a prolonged
three month strike preceeded by a two month industrial
slowdown at Vickers Shipbuilding in 1988, submarine
construction remains within contract deadlines for Vanguard
and Victorious [Ref. 3:p. xiv].
Each submarine will carry 16 three-stage solid-fuel
Lockheed Trident II D-5 missiles with stellar inertial
guidance and a maximum range of 6,500 nautical miles.
Development of the D-5 missile was on schedule in the United
States until the first submar i ne-1 aunched test of the
missile from the USS Tennessee on 21 March 1989; this was a
spectacular failure. British Defence Committee members were
briefed in April 1989 in the United States on the details of
the test failure (problems with thrust vector control of the
first-stage rocket motor) and concluded that there was no
cause for concern as a result of this one failure, citing
16
the superior test record of the missiles compared to that of
the Polaris A-3 at a similar stage of development [Ref. 3:p.
xvii]. However, "concern" was the reported official British
reaction to a second submerged test failure 16 August 1989
from the USS Tennessee off Cape Canaveral, Florida [Ref.
ll:p. 6]. U.S. Navy preliminary investigations revealed
that a design flaw caused the test failures [Ref. 12:p. Al].
Because the Trident II D-5 missile is much larger than the
Trident I C-4 more compressed gases are needed to eject the
missile from the submarine. As water rushes in to fill the
space left by the gas bubble, a plume of water follows the
missiie as it breaks the ocean surface. This larger than
expected plume of water is believed by engineers to be
exerting force and consequently damaging the nozzles. The
revised U.S. deployment date for the missile of 31 March
1990 should not affect the British Trident program schedule
[Ref. 12:p. Al ] .
At the start of its commission each Trident boat
will be loaded with 16 missiles at Kings Bay, Georgia. The
boat will then return to Britain and the warheads will be
fitted at Coulport. When the submarine is ready for her
long refit Cafter seven to eight years), the warheads will
be removed and serviced in the United Kingdom and the
missiles returned to King's Bay, Georgia. There will not be
specific American or British Trident missiles; the missiles
will comprise a single pool of which Britain will own a
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fixed number [Ref. 10:p. xxvi]. Although the U.K. will
purchase its required number of missiles, to which it will
take title, specific missiles will not become U.K. property.
This represented a £784 million savings in the Trident
program. The interpretation that the British are in effect
renting their deterrent forces has been denied vehemently by
British officials. In October 1987 the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs argued:
The Idea that we will only be leasing or hiring Tr ident
missiles is absolutely nonsense. We shall buy them
outright and they will remain ours.... ...We shall
continue to own the same number of missiles at all
times. They remain in United Kingdom hanas at all
times. [Ref. 10 :p. xxxi]
The Defence Committee of the House of Commons in its Third
Report on the Progress of the Tr ident Programme defended the
arrangement: "The point at issue m the American, ratner
than British, ref uroi shment of Trident missiles is whether
the inaependence of the British nuclear deterent is to any
degree compromised. We do not believe it will be.' [Ref.
10 :p . XXX 1
]
Although the D-5 missile is capaole of carrying 14
MIRV warheads, the actual number carriea in U.K. service is
classified. The British government indicated, however, that
each submarine will carry no more than the number of
warheads (128 warheaas) that would have been carriea if the
Trident I C-4 missile (eight warheads) had been procurea
[Ref. 13:p. 6]. By setting the self imposed limit in terms
of warheads per submarine the British are still free to vary
the numDer of warheads on ed^ch missile. The nurriDer can De
variea witnout major alterations to the missile. Although a
particular suomarine may actually only carry 128 warheads
some of the missiles coula be fitted with the maximum of 14
warheaos ana other missiles on the submarine downloaded.
Even thougn the warheads per submarine restriction appeared
to have been imposed to curb public fears of Irresponsible
proliferation of offensive nuclear delivery systems by the
British government, the Ministry of Defence is still
afforaeo a great deal of flexibility in targeting by being
able to vary the numoer of warheads per missile. A fully
1 oaaea miSSile can provioe a large footprint whereas the
aownloaaec ones offer extendec range. An investigation oy
Tne I "oepenaen: reporteo that the yiela of Britains warhead
Will oe aoo^T lOC ki lot ens [Ref. 14 J.
There co appear to be schedule problems with Trident
warneao proouction in the United Kingdom. The Trident
warneao oesign was "frozen" in 1987 at the conclusion of
wnat tne Director of Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)
describeo as a 'complex but highly successful development
programme' . Tne AWE Aioermaston complex is now involved in
three mam areas of Trident work: Trials and Assessments,
Technology Transfers, and Production. The Trial and
Assessments program, which concerns safety, performance and
effectiveness sucn as operations in extremes of temperature
ana vioration. ana assessment of any aging effects, is on
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schedule. Technology Transfers work covers the
manufacturing technology for non-fissile components for the
warheads; and, despite some manpower shortages, this program
is also expected to meet delivery schedules. [Ref. 3:pp.
xxi-xxi i ]
However, the Trident warhead production program is
vulnerable to problems with the construction of a capital
works program (A90 facility) at AWE Aldermaston and manpower
shortages at AWE Burghfield and AWE Aldermaston. The
production of fissile material involves plutonium pits and
highly enriched uranium components which are produced only
at AWE Aldermaston and mated with non-fissile parts from AWE
Burghfield and AWE Cardiff for assembly at AWE Burghfield.
Each re-entry body assembly takes approximately three
months. [Ref. 3:p. xxii] Although production of fissionable
components at AWE Aldermaston began in early 1988 with the
first service plutonium pits completed on schedule, the
aging A45 facility cannot accommodate full Trident program
production. In addition, staff shortages have been plaguing
the government weapons facilities on account of
resignations, retirements, and failure to attract additional
staff due to low civil servant pay. The capital works
program and the fulfilling of staff requirements at AWE
Aldermaston are of critical importance to the Trident
program and are major sources of potential delay. The
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Defence Committee subsequently concluded in June 1989 from
evidence submitted that
...the in-service dates of the second, third and fourth
Trident boats remain contingent on the satisfactory
operation of A90 . In turn, the achievement of
production in A90 on schedule (1992) and at required
levels will depend on recruiting and retaining the staff
required. [Ref. 3:p. xxvi]
3. ASMP, SRAM-2
Great Britain considers its submar i ne- 1 aunched
ballistic missiles to be its only truly strategic nuclear
capability. The British government has decided to buy a new
advanced nuclear missile to replace its old stockpile of
200-odd aging gravity nuclear bombs. There has been no
reference from the government or press to this purchase as a
strategic nuclear weapon system. However, because one of
the systems under consideration is the French air-launched
ASMP (Air-Sol Moyenne Portee) which the French do regard as
a strategic nuclear system, the topic will be reviewed here
since it constitutes a major potential improvement in
British nuclear forces with a possible "strategic"
app 1 i cat 1 on
.
Britain's stockpile of free fall nuclear bombs (WE
177) carried on the RAF Tornado is becoming obsolescent and
will need to be replaced by the mid to late 1990s. Because
British assessments indicate that improving Soviet air
defenses will make it harder for bombers to penetrate Warsaw
Pact air space, a standoff nuclear missile capable of being
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fired from bombers at a safe distance is being considered as
a rep 1 acement
.
Published reports suggest that prospects for a
proposed Joint British-French development of an advanced
nuclear missile have fluctuated over the last two years.
Throughout most of 1988 the British remained less
enthusiastic over the program than the French. As late as
March 1989 press reports indicated that Britain was set to
back out of the proposed British-French missile deal. The
problem with the missile proposal was that France's existing
ASMP missile built by Aerospatiale on which it would have
been based has insufficient range (186 miles) to meet Royal
Air Force requirements (250 miles) or NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe guidelines for future nuclear weapon
deployment. France saw no need for a longer range missile
and hence insisted that Britain would have to bear most of
the development costs. In addition the French missile would
employ 1970s technology which the British felt would be
outdated by the time the weapon entered the British arsenal.
One press report in August 1988 stated that Prime Minister
Thatcher was also reluctant to jeopardize Britain's special
nuclear relationship with the United States and was wary of
reliance on France [Ref. 15:pp. 1-23.
^See Chapter IV, Section D, "Anglo-American Relations"
for a more complete discussion of the U.S. -U.K. nuclear
re 1 at i onsh ip
.
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British interests subsequently have turned to the
American short-range attack missile (SRAM-2). The Boeing
missile under development will have a range acceptable to
the Ministry of Defence (250-300 miles). It would also
represent an off-the-shelf, state of the art technology
purchase for Britain. The British government has emphasized
that the warheads on any new missile would be solely British
and manufactured at AWE Aldermaston, as in the Trident
program. [Ref. 15:pp. 1-2, Ref. 16]
Some British and French press reports have indicated
that London's decision is leaning towards the American
missile. However, on 14 September 1989, while meeting with
French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement, British
Defence Minister Tom King announced that the Anglo-French
missile construction remained a serious option on a par
equal to the American one [Ref. 17:p. 8]. He did not
indicate, when a final decision would be made, although one
is expected by the end of 1989.
4. Command, Control, Communications
The high degree of secrecy surrounding nuclear
weapons in the United Kingdom makes it difficult to
determine how much attention has been paid by political and
military authorities to command, control and communications
^'-'3) issues. Despite the British government's investment in
the Chevaline project and Trident program, no single
significant program to improve British C3 performance or
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survivability has been publicly acknowledged. Some records
suggest that perhaps some funding for Trident related C3 are
concealed under other headings in the Ministry of Defence's
Long-Term Costings implying that there are indeed C^
modernization projects but the funding of which is hidden
for security or other reasons in other programs [Ref. 18:p.
28]. However, the Ministry of Defence Statement on the
Defence Est imates 1989 does not mention a C3 modernization
program.
According to David Greenwood's account, in
responding to persistent questioning by the Labour MP and
former Minister of State for Defence Dr. John Gilbert, at
the Select Committee hearings on 17 March 1982, Secretary of
State John Nott referred to "a continuing, on-going
programme for the updating of our command and control
systems in all areas." [Ref. 18:p. 28] His testimony also
suggested that funds budgeted for the maintenance of the
integrity of the command and control systems are included in
the totality of the Trident program and in the defence
budget in general [Ref. 18:p. 28].
The following summary of British command and control
arrangements for the sea-based nuclear deterrent is based on
an unclassified, unofficial source, and it may not be
entirely correct. To transmit orders from Royal Navy
Headquarters at Northwood to its Polaris submarines the U.K.
relies upon three VLF (very low frequency) transmitters at
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Criggion, Rugby, and Anthorn. Crlggion and Rugby are both
civil and Royal Navy sites whereas the Anthorn transmitter
is operated by NATO. Should these sites go off-line in
wartime a variety of back-up communication systems are
available. It has been reported that mobile transmitters
exist which would be dispersed and which could use
structures such as bridges and building complexes as
antennae. It has been speculated that Britain once used an
airborne VLF communication system similar to the U.S. Navy
TACAMO operating from the RAF base at Wyton in
Cambridgeshire. However, such a system is not believed to
be operational today. [Ref. 19:p. 661
In addition the Royal Navy operates LF (low
frequency) transmitters at Inskip and Crimond whose signals
can reach the submarines. The Royal Navy also has plans to
use the British Broadcasting Corporation LF transmitters
(BBC Radio 4) at Droitwich in an emergency. [Ref. 19:p. 663
It IS reasonable to assume that standard Royal Navy
shore-to-ship communication systems (MF, HF, VHF, UHF
transmissions) are also available for back-up. Some reports
have indicated that Britain has also had the use of VLF
stations at Halifax, Canada, and Simonstown, South Africa,
and for emergency contingency purposes U.S. VLF stations for
communication with SSBNs. [Ref. 4:p. 343
From the early to mid-1980s the VLF transmitters
at Criggion and Rugby have undergone a major modernization
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while the Anthorn transmitter is being similarly upgraded by
NATO. New receiving and transmitting equipment was
installed to improve VLF signal quality and to provide for
the automation of signal formatting for simpler operations
and quicker execution. tRef. 19:pp. 66-67]
Evidence suggests some British efforts to build an
ELF (extremely low frequency) transmitter in the United
Kingdom. In March 1984 U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee
testimony indicated that Britain had exchanged technical
information regarding ELF with the United States and had
indicated an intention to develop an ELF transmitter. By
March 1985 several Scottish sites were being considered
because of suitable rock formations and geological
conditions. By late 1985 Glen Garry near Fort William in
Scotland had been chosen as a site pending funding. [Ref.
19:p. 68] Subsequent development is not known.
Overall British defense 03 ^^^e been undergoing
improvements. A new bunker control center code-named
"Pindar" has reportedly been built beneath the Ministry of
Defence Headquarters in Whitehall [Ref. 19:p. 19]. Project
UNITER is the principal phase of a project designed to
provide a secure, survivable, integrated network for defense
communications. Stage one of Project UNITER will provide
the communications for the new UKADGE (United Kingdom Air
Defence Ground Environment) air defense system by the late
1980s [Ref. 19:p. 50]. The Royal Navy's OPCON (Operational
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Control) program, when integrated with UKADGE, is designed
to provide a comprehensive and centralized command and
control network for maritime operations around the United
Kingdom. The whole system will interface with SACLANT,
CINCNORTH, and IBERLANT war headquarters. [Ref. 19:pp.
95-96] However, no British programs have been identified in
public sources as being specifically devoted to improving
British strategic nuclear command, control, and
commun i cat i ons
.
B. FRANCE
1. SSBN: M-4, M-45, M-5
Five French SSBNs of the 9,000-ton Redoutable class
entered service between 1971 and 1980. (Le Redoutabl
e
.
December 1971; Le Terr ibl
e
. December 1973; Le Foudrovant .
June 1974; L' Indomptabl
e
. December 1976; and Ls. Tonnant . May
1980.) Each submarine has carried 16 M-20/TN 60 two-stage
solid-fuel SLBMs with a 3,000 kilometer range, penetration
aids, and a one megaton yield hardened re-entry vehicle.
Under the current modernization program all except the
Redoutable are expected to be backfitted with the new M-4
SLBM between 1987 and 1993. CLe. Tonnant . 1987;
L^Indomptable . 1989; Is. Terrible . 1991; and Ls. Fwdrpy^nt ,
1993) [Ref. 5:p. 166]. An operational test launch of the
M-4 was conducted by Le Tonnant on 15 September 1987 in the
Atlantic [Ref. 5:p. 166]. The M-4/TN-70 is a three-stage
solid-fuel SLBM with a 4,500 kilometer range, inertial
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guidance, and six multiple re-entry vehicles of 150 kilotons
each [Ref. 5:p. 165]. An improved version, designated M-4C,
is reportedly being developed with slightly extended range
to be carried in Le Tonnant . this due to the effects of a
lighter TN-71 warhead being installed CRef. 7:p. 5].
A sixth SSBN entered service in March 1985, and it
was equipped with 16 M-4 SLBMs. The reason for the 1978
program to build an additional SSBN was that six hulls would
be required to meet the criteria of three submarines
continuously available, two of which would be on patrol
[Ref. 5:p. 165]. Since January 1983 three submarines have
been on patrol at all times; previously a third SSBN was
available on patrol only 150 to 200 days a year [Ref. 20:p.
138]. Had she been funded in 1975 as originally planned she
would have carried the M-20 missiles like her predecessors.
As it is, L'' Inf 1 exible is of an intermediate design between
Le Redoutabl
e
and its new generation replacement, the Le
Triomphant class.
One hull of the new 14,200 ton Tr i omphant class,
which is approximately one and a half times the displacement
of the Redoutabl
e
class, is already under construction. The
first was ordered in fiscal year 1986 and the second is
expected to be ordered in fiscal year 1989, and a third in
fiscal year 1991, with a total of six planned at a total
cost of 65 billion francs. [Ref. 5:p. 165] However, by
mid-1989 the cost, already 20 percent higher than
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anticipated, was close to 80 billion francs [Ref. 21:p. 541.
In September 1989 Prime Minister Michel Rocard stated that
the cost over runs were so serious that the decision-making
process that led to the program would be reviewed [Ref.
22:p. 9]. The six Tr iomphant class submarines are expected
to replace the older SSBNs from 1994 to 2010 on a one for
one basis; hence, no expansion in SSBN fleet size is planned
[Ref. 23:p. 10]. The first two new generation SSBNs will be
be armed with 16 M-45 SLBMs and will later be retrofitted
with the M-5 SLBM under development [Ref. 23 : p . 103. The
M-45 SLBM, an improved version of the M-4, is reported to
have a range in excess of 5,000 kilometers and carry six
"independent trajectory" warheads of unknown yield [Ref.
23:p. 10]. The M-45 may carry the TN-75 warhead described
in one account as being equipped with "remarkable
steal thiness. " [Ref. 24:p. 176] The M-5 was initially
funded in 1988 and is expected to be in service by 2002 with
unit three [Ref. 5:p. 165]. The M-5 has been reported to be
capable of carrying as many as 12 MIRVed warheads [Ref.
25:p. 66]. The missile will have a range of 11,000
kilometers and sophisticated penetration aids to defeat
perceived developments in the Moscow ABM defenses [Ref. 7:p.
5]. Despite cost overruns in the submarine program and the
projected expenditure of 73 billion francs for the new
generation M-5 missile, the French government is persistent
in continuing modernization of its submarine nuclear forces
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at the expense of its land-based force improvements [Ref.
26:p, 123. However, in June 1989 the Minister of Defense
Jean-Pierre Chevenement conceeded that the SSBN program
would experience a six month delay in order to alleviate
planning problems and the backlog of work orders at the
Cherbourg Dockyard facility [Ref. 27:p. 14],
2. IRBM: S-4
The land-based element of French strategic nuclear
forces consists of 18 intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs) in hardened silos on the Plateau d^Albion in
Haute-Provence . The site was originally selected for its
high altitude (for range enhancement), low population
density, and good climate (for construction and maintenance)
[Ref. 28:p. 193. The currently installed S-3 missile came
into service in 1980-1982, The S-3 has a 3,000 kilometer
range with a one megaton yield and improved penetration aids
such as decoys and re-entry vehicle hardening against the
effects of a high-altitude nuclear explosion from an ABM
system. Despite reaction time being reported as about three
and a half minutes, long term survivability remains a
problem for the land-based IRBM forces due to their
vulnerability [Ref. 7:p. 43. Although President Giscard
d'Estaing decided to support construction of a land-based
mobile missile, SX , to succeed the S-3, it was not until the
Socialist government came to power that it was determined
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that SX would be ballistic rather than cruise [Ref. 28:p.
20].
The RPR-UDF government in office from March 1986 to
May 1988 originally proposed building 30 single-warhead
mobile IRBMs now designated S-4 to replace the 18 fixed S-3
IRBMs and the Mirage IV-P bombers by 1996 [Ref. 24:p. 176].
The military program law for 1987-1991 described S-4 as "a
light ballistic missile capable of depressed trajectories
and equipped with a penetration capability permitting it to
reach defended targets." [Ref. 29:p. 5649] Some have
likened the S-4 to the U.S. Midgetman missile [Ref. 30:p.
40]. Jane's Weapon Systems 1988-89 described the planning
for the S-4 as a two-stage, sol i d-prope 1 1 ant , land-mobile
system with a range of 4,500 kilometers, each missile
carrying three targetable and possibly MIRVed warheads in
the 20 kiloton range capable of random dispersal around
France by air or road in a period of tension [Ref. 7:p. 4].
Basing modes for the S-4 have yet to be determined,
however. In September 1988 the French Defense Minister
Jean-Pierre Chevenement, in presenting the military budget
program for 1989 indicated that the S-4 project would
undergo a significant delay due to cost overruns in the new
generation nuclear submarine program [Ref. 31 :p. 35]. The
S-4 program was placed on hold in 1988 and is still in an
uncertain status. The program technicians have been
directed to maintain a certain technological know-how
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without proceeding to a development stage [Ref. 32:p. 143.
Some military officials have expressed an interest in seeing
the S-45, a land version of the M-45 submarine missile,
placed in the silos .rather than to have them abandoned
completely [Ref. 33:p. 9].
Ultimately several questions remain unanswered by
the French government at this time. Should the missile
force on the Plateau d^Albion be modernized at all, and how?
Should a dedicated land-based triple-warhead missile (S-4)
be developed? If it is developed, how should it be
deployed? At any rate, as stated before, the French
government under President Fran^rois Mitterrand continues to
place priority on submarine strategic nuclear modernization
at the expense of land-based force improvements.
3 . ASMP
The air leg of France^s strategic nuclear forces
consists of 34 Mirage IV-P land-based strike aircraft, 18 of
which carry the ASMP ( Ai r-Sol -Moyenne-Portee ) air-to-surface
nuclear stand off missiles. The ASMP is a supersonic (Mach
3) liquid-fueled ramjet powered missile with integral
sol id-prope 1 1 ant booster with pre-programmed inertial
guidance and has a range of 100 kilometers at low altitude
(300 kilometers at high altitude). Several flight profiles
are possible. [Ref. 7:p. 7093 Some sources indicated that
it carries a 100 to 150 kiloton warhead [Ref. 25:p. 663.
Others claim that a 300 kiloton warhead was developed by the
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government agency Commissariat a l^Energle Atomique [Ref.
7:p. 709]. Former Defense Minister Charles Hernu also
indicated that the missile could carry a 300 kiloton warhead
[Ref. 25:p. 66].
Developmental flight tests of the ASMP began in 1980
and operational deployment was in May 1986. As stated
above, the ASMP has been deployed on a force of 18 Mirage
IV-P bomber conversions which will gradually be replaced by
Mirage 2000 Ns. The 18 Mirage IVs underwent conversion to
Mirage IV-P (for penetrat ion ) from May 1983 to December
1987. The modernization made improvements to the Mirage
IVs navigation and bombardment equipment as well as
advanced countermeasure systems. [Ref. 34:p. 13] The
modified aircraft attained initial operational capability
with Escadron de Bombardment 1/91 'Gascogne'' at
Mont-de-Marron on 1 May 1986 followed by Escadron de
Bombardment 2/91 "Marne' at St. Dizier on 1 December 1986
[Ref. 35:pp. 66-67]. The original plan was for the 18
Mirage IVs to remain in service until the S-4 was deployed,
at which time the ASMP would become the main nuclear
armament of the Mirage 2000 N force. The latest statements
indicate that they will remain in service until 1996 [Ref.
36 :p. 15].
Procurement under the 1 oi de proqrammat i on mi 1 i tai re
1990-1993 is planned for 45 (vice 75, previously) Mirage
2000 Ns by 1991 [Ref. 27:p. 14]. Eight ASMP-capable Mirage
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2000 Ns were funded in 1988 and six in 1989 [Ref. 35:p. 683.
As of June 1989 a total of three (rather than five)
squadrons in the FATAC (Force Aerienne Tact i que) will be
equipped with this aircraft. The first squadron became
operational 01 July 1988 at Luxeuil and the second is
expected to be operational at the end of 1989. The third
squadron will come into service in 1990-91. [Ref. 34:p. 19]
The 2000 N aircraft are equipped with terrain-
following radar for low-altitude penetration and will have a
range of 1,800 kilometers with two 1,700 liter drop tanks.
The payload consists of a single ASMP. Frances's strategic
aircraft would require refueling from eleven KC-135 tankers
to reach targets in the Soviet Union, and hence, even though
the Mirage 2000 N is an improvement over the Mirage IV-P it
is still not considered a strategic bomber by U.S.
definition. [Ref. 37:p. 841
4. Command, Control, Communications: Astarte, Ramses
An upgrading of the command, control , and
communications network for French nuclear forces has been an
important priority. The primary goal of the Ramses program
was to protect the network from EMP (electromagnetic pulse)
effects of a high altitude nuclear explosion. Former French
Defense Minister Hernu in 1982 stressed the importance of
hardening and redundancy in the C3 networks, arguing that
EMP would be an attractive means for the Soviet Union to
interupt or disrupt nuclear launch orders thereby
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neutralizing the French strategic forces without direct
strikes on French soil [Ref, 28:p. 273, The modernization
consists of two programs: Astarte (Aviation Station Relajs
de Transmissions Except i onel 1 es) and Ramses (Reseau Amont
Maille Strategique et de Survie).
The Astarte program was initiated in 1982 and is
expected to enter service in 1989. It consists of four
airborne transmission stations aboard four new version
Transal 1 aircraft equipped with redundant transmission means
for release authority to the SSBNs , land components, and
eventually to the airborne component. The program entails
purchasing and modifying the four aircraft; equipping the
airborne stations to tie into the Ramses network and to
retransmit the messages; purchasing VLF transmitters and
their associated antenna systems from the United States; and
studying and effecting EMP hardening in the aircraft. [Ref,
34:p. 19]- The Astarte has been likened to the U.S. Navy's
TACAMO program [Ref. 37:p. 851.
The Ramses program is a reliable, protected
land-based network that ensures that governmental decisions
reach the nuclear forces, both strategic and pre-strategi c
.
There are a multitude of lines connecting terminals and
nodes, and reliable communication with Astarte is achieved
through redundancy. The network system handles telephone,
telegraph, and digital data and is capable of automatic
reconfiguration to ensure continued on-line service. Two
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stages of the system have been undertaken. Ramses Stage 1
serves the principal governmental and military authorities
in the Paris area, the Astarte bases, and the ground Astarte
communications station. This Stage 1 went into service in
1988 for user evaluations. Ramses Stage 2 wi 11 complete the
network with extensions into the east and south of France
with connections to the First Army, the FATAC (Force
Aerienne Tactique), the Hades Division, the Mirage 2000 N
bases, the Plateau d^Albion, FAS (Force Aerienne
Strategique) bases not covered in Stage 1, ground Astarte
communication stations to support Mediterranean patrols, and
to FOST (Force Oceanique Strategique) fixed radio stations
transmitting to the SSBNs. The stage 2 upgrade will occur
between 1989 and 1993. A third stage is planned for the
1995-1996 time frame to improve security and to better
network management. [Ref. 34:p. 213 Total costs for the
Astarte and Ramses programs represent an investment
equivalent of another SSBN [Ref. 28:pp. 26-27].
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III. STRATEGIES AND TARGETING
A. BRITAIN
British nuclear strategy and targeting are closely
guarded state secrets and are not as widely discussed in
public as in France. Of course defense and nuclear issues
are debated in the British press and Parliament, but these
discussions rarely concern specifics of nuclear strategic
planning and targeting criteria. A great deal of the
information concerning these topics must be gleaned from
secondary sources. John Baylis noted that information
through interviews of retired and serving officials (both
military and civilian) was provided as long as the talk was
of f-the-record and the source neither quoted nor identified
[Ref. 38:p. 2291.
In emphasizing the critical importance of the Trident
system for Britain's defense, the British government has
stressed the technical and financial issues of the
procurement and has remained vague concerning the details of
the strategic rationale for Trident. This trend especially
concerns such specifics as how the increased accuracy and
number of warheads will affect Britain-'s future thinking on
nuclear employment doctrine and targeting. For example, in
1982, following the procurement decision, a Liberal MP asked
Conservative Prime Minister Thatcher about the circumstances
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that would lead the government to consider the independent
use of its strategic nuclear forces; she replied in rather
vague terms that the Trident nuclear forces were the only
proper and prudent choice should Britain have to stand alone
against any potential aggressor [Ref.39]. When the Labour
opposition claimed, in response to the Conservative
government''s refusal to discuss the strategic implication
that the Trident decision was an emotional spasm, the
Minister of Defence John Nott answered, "If it is an
emotional spasm it has been a disease of eight successive
Governments" [Ref. 40 3, implying that the strategic
rationale is well-thought-out, only not discussed openly in
detai 1
.
Such public vagueness has been typical of the British
nuclear policy-making process. According to Christopher
Bowie and Alan Piatt, several factors have contributed to
this lack of public information regarding British nuclear
strategies [Ref. 41:pp. 1-843. One of these factors
includes the extreme secrecy afforded the British government
under the 1911 Official Secrets Act, which states that no
official can release confidential information pertaining to
government decisions. The act makes it a criminal offense
for a government official to disclose any information
obtained in the course of his employment, classified or not,
to unauthorized persons. It is also an offense for anyone
having been formally entrusted with such information in
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confidence to disclose it under any but authorized
circumstances. Therefore, the possibilities for criminal
prosecution under the 1911 Official Secrets Act are
enormous.
The meaia are also tightly controlled under the
"D-notice" system under which each newspaper must
voluntarily submit materials relating to national security
to Whitehall for approval before publication. Although
these notices are voluntary and have no binding legal
authority, they are frequently used successfully to
discourage the British media from reporting on military
issues. With the exception of a few left-wing journals the
result IS that the media, having very limited access to
detailed technical information needed for a direct input
into the defense and nuclear policy-making process,
typically play the role of transmitting government defense
policy toopinion leaders and the public, rather than trying
to influence policy or exercise an independent voice.
In addition the deep secrecy surrounding the internal
operations, public information on the British government's
practices is limited by guidance given to civil servants in
the Cabinet Office in 1982 which stated that disclosure of
the government's decision-making processes would weaken its
cohesion and, hence, the existence of the particular cabinet
committees, their composition, subjects of discussion, etc.,
were not to be disclosed [Ref. 42:p. 343. In essence, leaks
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on general foreign policy issues are viewed as tolerable
within the system, but leaks concerning national security
information such as nuclear policy are strictly forbidden
CRef. 41 :p. 733. Compartmental izat ion of nuclear weapons
information further hides British nuclear weapons policy
under a cloak of secrecy within the executive branch.
Britain's parliamentary system enhances the executive
branch's predominant influence on nuclear issues. All
governments in the post-1945 era (with the exception of the
Labour administration of 1974-1979) have held a working
majority in Parliament and have been able to pursue issues
of nuclear policy with little to no interference by the
political opposition in the House of Commons. Given the
secrecy with which nuclear policy-making is carried on in
Britain, the executive branch is able to present Parliament
with policy f ai ts accompl is . To stay in power a British
government must maintain a majority in the House of Commons.
If the executive is unable to gain a majority vote on an
issue central to government policy, it must resign or seek a
vote of confidence. To avoid being turned out of office
British political parties have developed internal unity,
cohesiveness and voting discipline, especially on such
issues as nuclear policy. With such strict party discipline
the ruling party can easily vote to terminate parliamentary
debate on a nuclear issue and therefore has little trouble
in pushing its programs through Parliament. At least in the
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area of national security and nuclear policy, the major
function of Parliament is the ratification of policy rather
than Its formulation or alteration, and ratification is
generally automatic. [Ref. 41:pp. 18-19] The net result is
a lack of public discussion of national nuclear strategy
even within the House of Commons.
Under the British political system the dominance of the
executive branch, the weak role of Parliament, and the
powerful civil service mean
...that British parliamentarians or media commentators
are unable to engage in sophisticated discussion of
strategic targeting plans of British nuclear systems
because except for a few executive branch members no one
knows anything about British nuclear strategic planning
except through speculation that Moscow is a logical
target. [Ref. 41:pp. 17-183
1. Strategic Rationales for a British Nuclear Force
Public discussion and debate have decreased within
the last few years as the Trident program has matured.
Hence, one must look back to the original discussions and
debates in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the procurement
decision was being made in order to determine the strategic
rationales for Britain-'s nuclear deterrent force
repl acement
.
Several statements concerning reasons for acquiring
the expensive Trident system have been put forward by the
Thatcher government. First and foremost the British
government has defended its decisions on the grounds that
the Trident system will enhance deterrence. Most official
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statements on the role of the British deterrent are couched
in reference to the Alliance and its important contribution
to NATO defense policy. The credibility of the overall NATO
as well as the British national deterrent is enhanced by the
concept of a "second center of decision" role. A more basic
purpose of Britain^'s nuclear forces, however, is to deter a
nuclear strike on Britain itself. The decision to modernize
its strategic nuclear forces rather than abandon them may
also be seen as an effort on Britain's part to maintain a
perceived "great power status". Each of these apparent
rationales for a British nuclear strategic force is
discussed more fully below.
a. Allied Deterrence
British defense policy in general rests solidly
on allied co-operation within NATO. The Statement on the
Defence Estimates . 1988 reported: "British defence policy
remains founded on membership in NATO. We cannot ensure our
security other than through the collective strength of the
Al 1 iance. " [Ref . 43:p. 43 British security is almost never
described as being independent of the Western alliance
structure. Perhaps this is partly the result of Britain's
recent historical experience of achieving victory in two
world wars through successful alliances.
The British rely on the NATO "flexible response"
strategy for the earlier stages of deterrence and defense.
The Ministry of Defence declared in its Statement on the
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Defence Estimates 1989 that British defense policy is
"...committed to NATO's strategy of deterrence based on a
mix of nuclear and conventional f orces. . . that underpins
flexible response. " [Ref . 9:p. 3] The government has
declared that the Trident Force will be "...committed to
NATO and targetted in accordance with Alliance policy and
strategic concepts under plans made by the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR), save where Britain^s supreme
national interests otherwise require. " [Ref . 44:p. 13 The
British nuclear forces therefore are under national command
during peacetime, but they are under SACEUR in time of
emergency, although the British reserve the right to
withhold use of their nuclear arsenal and to pursue their
own employment preferences.
Various government statements have described
NATO deterrence as the supreme role of the British strategic
nuclear forces. Defence Secretary John Nott, in justifying
the purchase of the Trident system in 1980, defended the
government's decision on the grounds that it would enhance
deterrence: "The crucial role which our nuclear forces play
in enhancing Alliance security lies in providing a nuclear
deterrent capability committed to the Alliance yet fully
under the control of a European member ." [Ref . 453
Similarly, the Ministry of Defence paper. The Future United
Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Iq£QS., provided further
evidence of British emphasis on a deterrence strategy and
43
the view that NATO defenses are integral to British national
secur i ty
:
Britain commits all its nuclear capability to NATO
in conformity with concepts of collective deterrence
worked out in the Joint forum of the Nuclear Planning
Group. The decisive consideration in favour of a
British capability that is ultimately independent is the
contribution it makes to NATO's strategy of deterrence
and thus to our own national secur i ty . [Ref . 44:p. 3]
In fact, the text of the letter of 11 March 1982 sent by
Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan proposing the
Trident II sales agreement revealed that before the sale it
was understood that the United Kingdom Trident II force
would be assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and that, except where supreme national interests were at
stake, the force would be used "...for purposes of
international defence of the Western alliance in all
circumstances. " [Ref . 46]
b. Second Center of Decision
The notion of independent nuclear decision
centers has been used as a rationale for the British nuclear
strategic forces since the 1960s, when Defence Secretary
Denis Healey advocated the idea. The concept of a second
center for decision-making has allowed the United Kingdom to
show loyalty to NATO and also to play an independent role.
The logic underlying the concept of a second center of
nuclear decision-making within the Alliance is that
uncertainty improves deterrence, two decision centers
provide more uncertainty than one, and therefore a second
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decision center Improves deterrence. In 1980 then Defence
Secretary Francis Pym described the strengths of twin
decision centers to the House of Commons:
Soviet leaders would have to asesss that there was a
greater chance of one of them using its nuclear
capability than if there were a single decision maker
across the Atlantic. The risk to the Soviet Union would
be inescapably higher and less calculable. This is Just
another way of saying that the deterrence of the
Alliance as a whole would be the stronger, the more
credible and therefore the more ef f ect i ve . [Ref . 47]
A key assumption of this rationale is that
uncertainty improves deterrence. However, it is important
to understand exactly where that uncertainty lies. First,
the implication is that there is no uncertainty in the
British wi 1 1 to use nuclear weapons. The second center is
understood in essence not to add to confusion regarding
nuclear release but actually to expedite the launch should
the Prime Minister^s allies be unwilling to "push the
button." When questioned in the House of Commons in October
1987 under what circumstances the independent deterrent
would be used Secretary of State for Defence George Younger
avoided a specific answer and instead replied, "It is not
only important that we should be prepared to use them
[strategic nuclear deterrent forces], but it is vital that
the other side knows that we are prepared to use them. That
is the whole purpose." [Ref. 48:p. 209]
Secondly, there is no expressed British
government uncertainty or doubt regarding the U.S. nuclear
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umbrella. London has expressed faith in the American
nuclear guarantee and does not seek by purchasing Trident to
substitute a British guarantee for the American one.
The United States has massive nuclear striking
power. It has repeatedly made clear by its words and
actions, including its major force deployments in
Europe, its total commitment to help defend the
integrity of its European allies by whatever means are
necessary, without exception. The Government has great
confidence in the depth of resolve underlying the United
States commitment. [Ref. 44:p. 33
The burden of uncertainty therefore falls on
Soviet planning. The official strategic rationale for
Britain's independently controlled nuclear forces is to
increase Soviet uncertainty in gauging any NATO military
response to aggression. According to British policy papers
the Soviet leaders have to be convinced that even if they
thought that at some critical point in a conflict the U.S.
might hold back, the British force could still inflict a
blow so destructive that the penalty for aggression would
prove too high [Ref. 44: p. 53. In defending the Trident
procurement decision Defence Secretary John Nott stated:
Even if in some future situation Soviet leaders
imagined that the United States might not be prepared to
use nuclear weapons, having to take account of enormous
destructive power in European hands would compel them to
regard the risks of aggression in Europe as still very
grave. This additional element of insurance— ''the
second centre of decision'—has been a feature of
Alliance deterrence for over twenty-five years." [Ref.
45 3
Obviously what matter are Soviet perceptions.
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ihe second center role also appeared to have set
the criteria in terms of the striking power that the follow
on to Polaris would have to have. In 1980 the Ministry of
Defence expiaineo that to effectively meet the Deterrence
purpose of proviaing a second center of decision-making
within the Alliance the British force had to De "visibly
capable" of posing a massive threat on its own, not
dependent on U.S. forces for defense suppression, assent to
use or supplemental destruction capability [Ref. 44:p. 5].
In other woras the striking power offered by the Trident
system was required for a credible second center of nuclear
deci SI on-miaK 1 ng role.
The attraction of the second center of
decision-making approach for Trident lies in the fact that
It allows Britain to maintain an independent force while
insisting that it is for the good of the Alliance, By
emphasizing an independent deterrent capability it plays on
doubts about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee
but insists that only the Soviets, not the British
government, accept these doubts. An important aspect of the
concept, accoroing to Lawrence Freedman, is that British
deterrence rests not on a certainty of nuclear retaliation
but rather on the uncertainty that retaliation would be
withheld [Ref. 49:pp. 129-1303.
c. Last Resort National Nuclear Force
Trident must also be seen in the light of the
strategic protection it provides Britain itself, including
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the hedge it offers Britain should an alliance breakdown
occur. The Defence Secretary was quoted in 1982 as saying,
"Im not Duying it [Trident IIJ for NATO, In the last
resort we must be able to stand alone. I'm greatly in
favour of the Alliance, but you never can tell, and I can't
be sure that the Alliance will be as healthy in 20 years
time as it is today." [Ref. 50] To quote Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher:
We have never been alone before. I trust we will
never be alone again. It is reasonable and prudent to
make proper provision for the defence of this country if
we were. Only then could we stand up to any potential
aggressor. [Ref. 393
In a March 1987 interview in Moscow, the Prime Minister was,
in contrast to the above statement, more emphatic about the
need for nuclear weapons should Britain have to stand alone
in its defense.
Nuclear deterrence is the only means allowing small
countries in effect to stand up to big countries. On
the basis of conventional weapons this simply cannot be
done. A small country, if it stands alone can stand up
to a big country if it has nuclear weapons....
Historically, Great Britain had occasion to stand alone.
Kitler occupied the whole of Europe, and we were alone.
America had not yet entered the war and Hitler haa not
yet attacked the Soviet Union. We have this experience.
We were alone. [Ref. 51]
Hence, an underlying reason for continuing the deployment of
a strategic nuclear system with the Trident program is that
NATO may not last and that ultimately Britain is responsible
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for her own defenses and cannot "shuffle them off on another
nuclear power." [Ref. 52:p. 25] Some view the implicit role
of British nuclear weapons as a last resort national
deterrent to be the only fully rational argument for the
British nuclear deterrent's existence [Ref, 4:p. 63.
Placing emphasis on its national rather than NATO role as
"the ultimate guarantor of national security" or as a "last
resort" also plays on national sentiments to garner greater
public support for the expensive weapon system.
It IS certainly difficult to imagine scenarios
and situations in which there is a strategic rationale for
using the Trident firepower independently of NATO. It is
equally difficult to say with confidence that there would
never be circumstances when the British might not want a
last resort deterrent. This analysis led Lawrence Freedman
to conclude
The mos.t compelling strategic rationale for a British
nuclear force, therefore, resides less in the immediate
requirements of British defence than in the
uncertainties of the future. It is a rationale that has
an appeal that is more primitive than intellectual, but
IS no less powerful for that. [Ref. 13:p. 139]
d. Great Power Status
One additional argument is that Britain''s
decision to modernize its nuclear strategic forces was
significantly influenced by the desire to enhance or ratify
British international status as a great power. For Britain,
nuclear weapons were seen as a cheap means of deterring
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aggression in Europe while keeping an Empire and
Commonwealth. But nuclear weapons have not arrested the
relative economic decline of Britain nor did they arrest the
crumbling of the Empire. Nonetheless a dominant theme of
Conservative Party politics has been the belief that nuclear
weapons confer Great Power prestige and influence upon
Britain, thus enabling British interests to be advanced in
superpower and NATO negotiations. Britain proudly
proclaims, that unlike France, she is the only European
nation whose nuclear forces are clearly committed to the
collective Alliance deterrent concepts, planning and
strategy, and no other European NATO member has even the
potential to make such a commitment. As published in the
gUtgmg nt OR ths. Pgf^nce ggti m^tg? 1932, "We [United
Kingdom] are... the only European nation to contribute to all
three legs of the NATO triad of f orces--strategic nuclear,
theatre nuclear, and convent ional --that underpins flexible
response. " [Ref . 9:p. 33 "The Government regards this
distinctive British contribution to NATO as of great
importance ." [Ref , 44:p. 43
The fact that Britain^s nuclear deterrent forces
were compared with, and deemed uniquely superior to the
French forces because of the British contribution to NATO,
suggests that London considered the implications of a course
of action (or inaction) with regard to their nuclear force
modernizations that would have left France as the only
50
European nuclear power. Hence, even though the costs of
procuring Trident might be enormously expensive for an
economically declining medium power, the political rationale
is clear. The British government was not about to accept or
admit defeat politically by allowing France to remain as the
only European nuclear power, as Lawrence Freedman described,
"confirming its ascendancy over Britain." [Ref. 49:p. 139]
The prospect of France surviving as the only independent
strategic nuclear power in Europe has been used to criticize
the Labour Party's defense policy of placing British
strategic forces (including Trident) in arms control
negotiations with the Soviet Union [Ref. 53:p. 153. Having
a nuclear arsenal commands a sort of respect and it might be
a valuable source of international power in some unforeseen
circumstances.
2. British Nuclear Targeting
Targets for the British strategic nuclear forces are
allocated by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
(JSTPS) at the U.S. Strategic Air Command in Omaha,
Nebraska. There, a European team along with British
officers participate in the planning. Operational plans are
formulated by the Nuclear Activities Branch at Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). The targets
that British SSBNs are eventually allocated form part of the
European Nuclear Operations Plan (NOP) which in wartime
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would be directed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR). [Ref. 54:p. 1193
However, in order to be able to carry out plans In
support of uniquely British national interests, separate
targeting packages are believed to be carried by the SSBNs
during patrols. These separate U.K. plans are worked out at
the Ministry of Defence headquarters. They were the
responsibility of the Navy Department and the Defence
Intelligence Staff, but in the reorganization of the
Ministry of Defence in early 1985 nuclear targeting was made
the responsibility of the Nuclear Policy Directorate, headed
by a civilian under the Deputy Under Secretary (Policy).
Although target planning details are still left to the
military, there appears to have emerged an increased input
from the civilian policy side regarding general targets to
hold at risk. [Ref. 54:pp. 120-1213
a . Moscow
It is generally agreed by experts that the
existing Polaris force could be used to threaten to destroy
civilian population and industry in the Soviet Union.
According to Catherine Kelleher, British targeting plans
have in the past concentrated on counter-city use,
especially against Moscow and roughly ten major
urban-industrial complexes in the Soviet Union [Ref. 55:p.
4653. The Polaris system has not been considered ideal for
theater strikes since it Is rather inflexible, unresponsive
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and too inaccurate for military targeting. Hence, tl^e idea
gained ground tl^at the British force was suitable largely
for counter-value retaliation (and would be held in reserve
during the early stages of nuclear retaliation). It is
widely believed that the British government has placed a
high priority on being able to attack Moscow. The United
Kingdom has spent over £1 billion on a re-entry vehicle
(Chevaline) intended to preserve a capability against
Moscow. Sir Michael Qui n Ian, as deputy under secretary of
state in the Ministry of Defence, confirmed the "Moscow
criterion" in parliamentary evidence: "There is a concept
which Chevaline makes clear, that Governments did not want a
situation where the adversary could have a sanctuary for his
capital and a large area around it." CRef. 56:p. 107]
However, there is speculation that the Pol ar is/Cheval ine
system, in order to achieve a penetrating effect on Soviet
ABM defenses, might have committed Britain to an attack on a
few and possibly no more than one large target CRef, 54:p.
123 3 .
b. Semi-Hard Military and Civilian Targets: "Key
Aspects of Soviet State Power"
As early as 1977 the argument was raised that
for a successor deterrent system it might be advantageous
for Britain to deploy a force capable of threatening a
qualitatively wider range of targets in the Soviet Union
than was feasible with the Polaris system [Ref. 4:p. 7]. It
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was argued that for deterrence to work Britain must exert
the necessary influence on Soviet leaders.
The argument continued that a small deterrent
force did not necessarily have to pursue targeting for the
destruction of civilian population and industries. Rather,
by increasing its accuracy the British force could launch an
effective attack on soft civilian targets and soft military
and semi-hard military or civilian targets including ABM and
air defenses, early warning and control radars,
hydroelectric or thermal (nuclear) power stations, heavy
industrial complexes, military airfields and naval ports.
The argument had technical and strategic implications: by
procuring and investing in a missile system with increased
accuracy, Britain could pose a more credible threat to
semi-hard military and civilian targets as well as soft
civilian targets. [Ref. 4:p. 42]
The Trident system certainly offers more
discriminating capabilities. It has been reported that with
the Mark 12A/W78 re-entry vehicle/warhead combination
Trident II D-5 is expected to achieve a single shot
probability of kill (SSPK) of 0.364 against 3,500 psi silos
and 0.709 against 1,000 psi silos CRef. 57:p. 186]. If two
such re-entry vehicles were cross-targeted with reported
CEPs of 0,05 nautical miles then Trident II D-5 can achieve
an SSPK of 0.837 against 3,500 psi silos/shelters and 0.993
against 1,000 psi hardened ones [Ref. 57:p. 186]. This
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accuracy has led some American advocates of the system to
claim that its counter-sllo capability is essentially
equivalent to that of the best U.S. land based ICBMs CRef.
57:p. 1863. This capability was noted in the British press
and some people criticized the acquisition of the Trident II
system as having "first strike" implications. In covering
the failed test shot of the missile on 21 March 1989 The
Guardian reported, "The Trident II is designed to give
submarines the ability to destroy Soviet missiles in their
hardened silos," implying that that was the British intent
[Ref. 58:p. 8j.
British government defense documents indicate
otherwi se
:
The Government wishes to make it absolutely clear that
the increasea accuracy of the Trident D-5 system played
no part in its decision to adopt the more modern
system.... The reasons for our choice are those sent
out in this document; essentially they hinge on the
retention of commonality with the United States Navy.
[Ref. 13:p. 6]
Survivability concerns led to a submarine-based system, and
cost-effectiveness criteria encouraged the selection of the
most modern U.S. SLBM to enjoy the benefits of
" commonal i ty .
"
The size of the British force has repeatedly
been described as that suitable for a policy of "minimum
deterrence", i.e., the minimum size compatible with ensuring
a cost-effective deterrent at all times. However, the
government did opt for 16 missile tubes per submarine rather
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12 tubes which had been a studied option and for a missile
system capable of carrying a larger number of warheads than
currently planned to "...provide flexibility to cope with
any possible improvements in Soviet anti-ballistic missile
defences throughout the life of the force." [Ref. 13:p. 63
The Ministry of Defence was quick to point out that this did
not imply that the maximum capacity would be deployed, and
that the total number of warheads would not exceed those
based on the C-4 missile system [Ref. 13:p. 63.
This increased flexibility apparently caused a
rethinking of British targeting policy in the early 1980s.
A 1980 memorandum on the Trident system suggested that the
British consider in judging their targeting requirements
"...what type and scale of damage Soviet leaders might think
likely to leave them critically handicapped afterwards in
continuing confrontation with a relatively unscathed United
States." [Ref. 44:p. 53 Even though the U.K. government
refuses to make public its nuclear targeting policy and
plans or to define precisely what it deems the minimum level
of destructive power necessary for deterrence, it did
indicate a shift with Trident away from a policy of
anti-cities destruction to one which targeted Soviet state
power and infrastructure. "The Government however thinks it
right now to make clear that their concept of deterrence is
concerned essentially with posing a potential threat to key
aspects of Soviet state power." [Ref. 44:p. 63 The 1987
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aefense wh:te paper reconfirmea the criteria of targeting
<ey aspects cf Soviet state power rather than the maximum
possiole numoer of individual targets and indicated that
Trioent forces would deploy with the minimum number of
warheaas consistent with this requirement [Ref. 59:pp.
40-41 ] .
This shift in targeting strategy is believed to
have oeen iargeiy inspireo by Sir Michael Quinlan, the
Permanen: Unaer Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, who as
a senior McD official invoivea in the purchase of Trident in
198G ana as a aevout Catholic, believed that attacks on the
Soviet civilian population would be immoral [Ref. 60 :p. 4J
.
Tnrcugn wr. ite papers and parliamentary evidence he pushed
forwaro new views for now Trident s enhanceo capability
snou'.o be useo. The new Br 1 1 1 sn strategy would offer the
option ct nuc. ear steps short of an all-out striKe on
Moscow. However. it nas oeen reported that the Prime
Minister aoes no: necessarily share Sir Michael s views
regarcmg the neeo for a more discriminating strategy [Ref.
60:p. 4]. In eviaence to Parliament Sir Michael Ouinlan
suggesiea that 'Soviet state power" may "...embrace a range
of targets lying oetween hitting a large city and hitting a
silo.' [Ref. 56:p. 85] However, since the 1980 Open
Government Document was issued there has been little
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clarification as to which targets should be assigned to the
Trident submarines, either under a NATO or national strike
plan.
B. FRANCE
The specifics of Frances's nuclear strategy and targeting
are closely held national defense secrets. However, a
greater effort is made by French officials than by British
ones to disseminate national nuclear policy, and
consequently it is more widely discussed in public. Such
open discussion appears to have contributed to broad popular
and political support for the French declaratory policies of
proportional deterrence and autonomy in defense matters. As
a result, France is among the few Western countries with
strong domestic support for nuclear forces and associated
pol icies.
In order to maintain this national consensus, statements
concerning French nuclear policies and strategies are the
result of a carefully co-ordinated and orchestrated
bureaucratic process involving several French governmental
agencies including the Elysee Palace, the Hotel Matignon
(the office of the prime minister), the Rue St. Dominique
(the Defense Ministry), and the Quai d^Orsay (the Foreign
Ministry) [Ref. 20:p, 1283. Like Britain's Parliament,
France''s Senate and National Assembly have minimal roles in
defense policy formulation and no role at all in nuclear
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targeting [Ref. 20:pp. 128-129]. But in contrast with the
situation in Britain, in France relatively extensive
discussions of national nuclear employment options take
place. Detailed and informative articles are often
published by Defense Ministry officials and other high
government officials in the monthly Journal Defense
Nat i ona 1
e
. Even though technical and financial
considerations have affected French strategic nuclear
modernization efforts, the political and strategic
rationales for these nuclear programs have been emphasized
by French officials. These improvements and modernizations
demonstrate a French determination to provide a nuclear
force Detter able to carry out published strategic doctrine.
French strategic nuclear force modernizations of the
late 198Cs have not been accompanied by any new declared
strategic doctrine or targeting policy. Recent speeches and
statements by President Fran9ois Mitterrand, Prime Minister
Michel Rocard, and Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement
have described the force modernizations in terms similar to
those of policies announced in the 1970s and early 1980s,
with some refinement.
Two factors may account for the lack of innovation in
publicly articulated French targeting plans. One
possiDility may be that there are serious divisions of
opinion among government officials as to what that policy
shoula be and whether changes are needed. The continuing
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debate regarding flexible limited options and force
modernizations is discussed more fully below. A new or
refined targeting policy, in keeping with past French
actions, is unlikely to be announced until there is a clear
consensus behind a new policy. At this point it apparently
is not worth risking the political capital invested in the
domestic support for nuclear weapons to raise the thorny
issue publ icl y
.
A second factor may be Mi tterrand''s strategic vision for
France and Europe. Mitterrand has emphasized a policy for
the French nuclear deterrent whose raison d^^tre is to
prevent war, and he has encouraged U.S. -Soviet and East-West
conventional arms control initiatives in order to reduce the
risks of war. Given Gorbachev's initiatives and reforms in
Eastern Europe, progress on U.S. -Soviet strategic arms
reduction talks, movement on reducing conventional forces in
Europe, and an apparent widening of East-West detente, now
is probably not an opportune moment for policy announcements
concerning the specific targeting of French nuclear weapons
against the Soviet Union.
1. Strategic Rationales for a French Nuclear Force
Since France first developed an independent
deterrent, its doctrine has been that there is a fundamental
difference between nuclear and conventional weapons and that
nuclear weapons are only usable when national survival is at
stake. This French understanding of the chasm between
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conventional ana nuclear war was recently reiterated by
Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chev^nement before the Soviet
General Staff Voroshilov Academy in April 1989.
In the art of war, the nuclear weapon has brought about
a fundamental discontinuity. For a long time, certain
theorists nave wanted to see in the nuclear weapon only
a more powerfully destructive weapon than conventional
art i 1 1 ery ....
In reality. the nuclear arsenals, by their
aestructive powers, have made war outdated as a rational
political means for settling conflicts between advanced
countries, when tney are endowed with such weapons.
[Ref. 61 :p. 183
Tne Frencn strategy which has evolved from this perspective
regarding nuclear weapons is centered upon one of
proportional deterrence. The rationale for an independent
nuclear arser.ai has been to " sanctuar i ze" French territory.
Aithougn tnis nuclear protection is understood to encompass
France s vital interests. exactly what constitutes the
nation s vital interests has remained oelioerately
amoiguous. Tne independent French nuclear forces ano their
subsequent modernizations are not only the foundation of
Frencn defense pel icy but: have been seen by some as a pillar
of European security, thus ensuring France a role in
European and world affairs. Each of these rationales for
French nuclear forces (proportional deterrence,
sanctuar isat ion . deliberate ambiguity, and great power
status) as tney relate to the strategic nuclear force
modernization programs is examined below.
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a. Proportional Deterrence
The primary strategic rationale for French
nuclear forces is dissuasion or deterrence. The doctrine
announced dy General Charles de Gaulle in 1964 when the
first Mirage IV bombers became operational has essentially
remained the same.
The path of deterrence is henceforth open to us, for the
act of attacking France would be equivalent for any
aggressor to undergoing frightful destruction himself.
Of course, the megatons that we could launch would not
equal in number those that Americans and Russians are
able to unleash. But, once reaching a certain nuclear
capability in as far as one''s own direct defense is
concerned, the proportion of respective means has no
vai ue . L Ref . 62
j
The oeclaratory French nuclear strategy remains
based on a theory of proportional deterrence. It is rootea
in a capability to inflict: damage greater than the value to
the Soviet Union of destroying France. The basic logic of
this "deterrence oy the weaK of the strong" (J_a dissuasion
ou f a 1 b 1 e ay. fort ) is that France's threat of nuclear
retaliation can oeter the Soviet Union because the damage
France cou 1 a cause by targeting Soviet cities exceeos wnat
the Soviet Union would stano to gain in conquering or
destroying France. Although tnere has oeen criticism of tne
doctrine, on grounds that the remaining nuclear capabilities
of a partially maimed and bitter Soviet Union could totally
devastate France, official statements continue to oefend the
concept. In 1976, French President Vaiery Giscard d'Estaing
reiterated the doctrine by stating that French strategic
nuclear force capabilities represented "an almost
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unpreceaented disparity between what an aggressor stands to
gain and what he risks losing as a result of his
aggression." [Ref. 63:p. 13] More recently in a speech of
11 October 1988 before the Institut des Hautes Etudes de
Defense Nationale, President Fran9ois Mitterrand reaffirmed
the French strategic doctrine in the context of the
government's strategic nuclear modernization programs and
Frances sufficiency criteria.
Deterrence, is not formed in order to win war, but
rather in oroer to prevent it, to hinder it. It requires
that we maintain our forces in a state of suf f ici ency--
in quantity, in quality, in capabilities--, in order to
be in a position to inflict upon the aggressor oamages
at least equivalent to the stake that we represent. Our
nuclear force can destroy, a tragical hypothesis but
which serves as the basis of our reasoning, a territory
at a distance of 4,000 kilometers with a surface area at
least equal to that of our own territory. What would be
the interest for anyone in attacking a country like ours
wh 1 en , after a nuclear war would have to deal witn a
frightful aevastation while the aggressor would suffer
as much?
Our nuclear capac i ty . . . i s sufficent to fulfill the
role that we attriDute to it. LRef. 64: pp. 16-17]
On 5 Apri"! 1989 before the Soviet General Staff' s Vor i sh i 1 ov
Acaaemy in Moscow Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Cnevenement
reiteratec tnese same concepts of proportional aestruction
in explaining Frencn nuclear deterrence policy as a oasis
for the aefense policy of a medium-sized nation in Europe
[Ref . 61 :p. 19]
.
Recently there seems to have been a refinement
in the sufficiency criteria, perhaps in order to justify
cutbacks. ae:ays, and procurement stretchouts owing to
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fiscal constraints in the French strategic nuclear
modernization programs. In the early 1980s, from statements
by then-Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy , Col. Guy Lewin of the
Defense Ministry planning department, and Gen. Jeannou
Lacaze, chief of staff of the armed forces, the sufficiency
criteria for proportional deterrence appeared to be based on
France being able to inflict on an aggressor damage "Judged
superior" to the vital interests or demographic and economic
potential of France [Ref. 20 :p. 1313. The more recent
statements above from President Mitterrand and Defense
Minister Chevenement in 1988 and 1989 suggest that the
criteria for sufficiency have been scaled back; the
preferred terminology in describing the proportional
deterrence sufficiency criteria now appears to be the
ability to inflict damage "at least equivalent to" the
potential of France. Although there may be subtle changes
in the exact meaning of sufficiency, one may nonetheless
view French strategic nuclear force modernizations as
reflecting a continuing effort to meet the sufficiency
criteria of a theory of proportional deterrence,
b. Sanctuarisation
Because of the radical nature of weapons of mass
destruction in terms of the levels of damage and death that
they can inflict, the French have argued that they are
usable only when the survival of a nation is at stake.
Reasoning that a nation (e.g., the United States) would not
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risk its ultimate survival even for the sake of an ally,
France felt a need to develop an independent force in order
to defend itself in the nuclear era. The possession of
nuclear weapons is therefore believed to turn French
territory into a sanctuary, the argument being that if
France has the capability to attack Soviet territory
directly with nuclear weapons, France is less likely to be
subject to nuclear strikes. As David S. Yost has noted, the
most explicit statements of when France^s strategic nuclear
forces might be used concern direct nuclear attack on France
itself [Ref. 20:p. 1503. "As concerns the use of nuclear
weapons, there are all sorts of situations and possible
hypotheses.... But there is a central point in our
planning, that any nuclear attack on France's soil would
automatically provoke nuclear retaliation." [Ref. 653
The continued emphasis of the strategy on the
primacy of independence, defined as protecting the national
"sanctuary" with nuclear weapons, may by due to concerted
efforts to maintain the domestic national consensus for
nuclear weapons. Robbin F. Laird has suggested that
extensive public debate about the use of French nuclear
weapons for any purpose other than for the defense of French
territory would intensify conflict over the political
purposes to which French nuclear forces would be employed
and erode domestic support for French nuclear weapons policy
[Ref. 66:p. 843. Nonetheless, since the mid-1970s, French
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leaders have at times backed away from the rigid, inflexible
notion of exclusively sanctuarized French territory.
President Giscard d^Estaing expanded the scope of potential
interests served by French military power including the
nuclear forces by introducing in 1976 a concept of an
enlarged sanctuary (sanctuar isat ion gUrqig>- A year
earlier Prime Minister Jacques Chirac had declared, "we
cannot be content to "sanctuar ize'' our own territory, and we
must look beyond our frontiers." [Ref. 67:p. 12] The French
government ceased using the term after public criticism of
the move in French policy from one of defending national
territory to one of apparent extended deterrence [Ref. 66:p.
85] .
Whether the Federal Republic of Germany is under
France^s nuclear deterrent protection is a question of much
debate. Although Defense Minister Hernu stated in June 1985
that France and West Germany share security interests in
common, it has been pointed out that security interests are
not vital interests. This implies that the extent of
France's nuclear guarantee remains as ambiguous as before.
[Ref. 20:p. 152]
c. Deliberate Ambiguity
French strategic nuclear doctrine insists
on uncertainty, incal cul abi 1 i ty , and ambiguity in order to
enhance deterrence. This element is well illustrated in the
deliberate ambiguity surrounding the concept of French
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"vital interests". Since the sanctuarisat ion elarqie
controversy in 1976, statements by government officials have
remained ambiguous as to what constitutes France''s vital
interests and as to what distance the French nuclear
deterrent extends. Defense Minister Charles Hernu explained
the reason for not explicitly defining vital interests being
that it placed the burden of uncertainty upon the aggressor,
knowing that a miscalculation would bring an immediate
mortal response [Ref. 68:p. 133. The argument is that the
deterrent's value is diminished if the adversary knows
beforehand the conditions under which it will be used.
Regarding France's vital interests Raymond Barre alluded to
the "approaches" to France, to "neighboring and Allied
territories," and to "immediate" neighbors [Ref. 69:p, 153.
Subsequent governments have been equally vague in defining
the extent of French nuclear deterrence. Prime Minister
Pierre Mauroy in 1981 and 1982 said that, "Aggression
against France does not begin when an enemy penetrates the
national territory." [Ref. 70 3
One of the more recent statements concerning
France's vital interests was given by Defense Minister
Jean-Pierre Chevenement in April 1989 in Moscow. The
ambiguity is obvious.
In fact, our nuclear forces protect at the same time
both our national territory, which is defined in
geographical terms, and our vital interests, whose
definition is political. Now, being given the limited
expanse of the European theater and the heavy density of
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its population, France sees its destiny particularly
tied to that of its neighbors, that is to say, that its
vital interests can be very quickly affected. [Ref.
61:p. 21]
This statement is evidence of a growing tension in French
nuclear doctrine, the domestic need to emphasize the
independence of French nuclear forces protecting the
national sanctuary and the need to demonstrate France's
involvement in extended European security responsibi 1
i
tes
while at the same time remaining completely ambiguous
regarding employment criteria.
d. Great Power Status
France developed nuclear weapons primarily in
order to strengthen her defense posture, but nuclear weapons
and the technological accomplishments associated with their
development also contributed to restoring a certain
perceived "grandeur" that befitted France [Ref. 71 :p. 3063.
Following the humiliation and devastation of World War II,
the possession of nuclear weapons has been seen by
successive French governments as one means (among others) of
re-establishing France's prestige and status in Europe and
of ensuring French influence in world affairs [Ref. 72:pp.
168-1693. Nuclear weapons were seen by de Gaulle as a
"
.let on de presence " (token of presence) among the
superpowers of the world and a force de persuasion to enable
the voice of France to be heard [Ref. 72:p. 1693. Admiral
Marcel Duval has concluded after analyzing many of General
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de Gaulle's statements that de Gaulle's personal commitment
to rapidly developing a thermonuclear capability was
political rather than strategic in nature; such a military
capability, in addition to being a requirement of national
independence, offered France a "means of sitting down at the
same table as the major powers." [Ref. 73:p. 63 Statements
by French officials in the last few years have also
emphasized the essential contribution that the French
nuclear deterrent forces offer to the balance of power for
war prevention in the world and particularly in Europe [Ref.
6l:p. 21: Ref. 64:p. 153.
Jolyon Howorth has observed that with regard to
the strategic nuclear role, under Mitterrand there has been
an intensification of Gaul list great-power posturing, in
terms of the aeclaratory priority attached to nuclear
doctrine [Ref. 71 :p. 3113. A statement regarding such great
power influence and nuclear weapons can be found in a the
speech by Prime Minister Michel Rocard of 12 September 1989.
In order to guarantee its independence and to cement its
national identity, our country has made the choice of an
independent defense, founded upon an autonomous strategy
of nuclear deterrence. This strategy constitutes an
element of stability for our international affairs of
state: It allows our country to play an essential role
in the world wide balance of powers, it constitutes
today the promise of sustained influence. [Ref. 74:p. 53
Therefore nuclear weapons, their modernization, and
associated doctrines are viewed within the French government
as a means to restore and maintain French influence in world
69
affairs. In particular, as regards stability and security in
Europe.
2. French Nuclear Targeting
The responsibility for the preparation of targeting
plans for French strategic nuclear forces has remained with
the chief of staff of the armed forces since September 1968.
The procedure for selecting targets has been described as
fol lows:
...selections of possible targets. . .are assigned to the
delivery vehicles and... are enumerated and regularly
updated by the command posts at Taverny and
Lyon-Mont-Verdun . It is the chief of state, assisted by
his Conseil de Defense, who designates these targets
from a catalogue submitted to him. CRef. 75]
This summary suggests that the chief of staff of the armed
forces and his subordinates Ce .g., commanders of the specific
strike forces) actually prepare the operational strike plans
which concern such details as timing and deconf 1 ict ion . It
is the President of the Republic, with the advice of the
leading officials concerned with national security who
comprise the Conseil de Defense, who selects targets for an
execution. It appears that prior to developing specific
target plans, the military receives targeting guidance from
the civilian policy side—namely, key Defense Ministry
officials, the President, and the Conseil de Defense.
a. Enlarged Anti-cities
French targeting has historically been aimed at
cities, primarily due to technological and strategic
capability limitations. For instance, from 1964 to 1971
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Mirage IV bombers were France's only means of delivering
nuclear weapons; France had little choice but to target
Soviet population centers as a deterrent. The objective of
the targeting plans was to cause a certain number of Soviet
fatalities, roughly equivalent to the population of France.
[Ref. 20 :p. 131] However, in 1980 there was a "refinement"
of strategic targeting plans. More emphasis was placed on
the threat of destroying the infrastructure of Soviet
administrative control, as well as economic and Industrial
assets, the oeuvres vi ves or vital works of the adversary.
This new targeting criteria is known as an enlarged
anti-cities strategy. This strategy emerged in part due to
the realization expressed in 1977 by General Mery that
Soviet civil defense could, by offering some population
protection, lessen the effect of the anti-cities deterrent.
[Ref. 20:p. 131] Col. Guy Lewin of the Defense Ministry's
planning Department annouced the new strategy in January
1980.
The neutralization of the adversary [state's]
administrative, economic, and social structures, the
destruction of the framework of life and activity of
millions of persons constitute damage that would be
difficult to accept even if a part of the population
concerned by these destructions escapes immediate death.
[Ref. 76:p. 27]
Later that same year Prime Minister Raymond Barre also
referred to France's ability to inflict assured destruction
upon both an adversary's cities and economy [Ref. 69:p. 12].
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Despite the shift in French doctrine to an
enlarged ant
i
-cities strategy, it has not been so great as
to be a question of counter-force priorities displacing the
"counter-cities" policy. Defense Minister Charles Hernu in
1981 stated that Mitterrand's strategic nuclear force
modernization did "not imply any change in our anti-cities
strategy, corollary of deterrence of the strong by the
weak." [Ref. 77:p. 153
The new targeting policy has been described as
enhancing French deterrence policy by being more operational
and credible because it holds at risk what Soviet leaders
value most; that is, economic and administrative control
rather than civilian lives [Ref. 20:p. 133], This change in
doctrine, however, was made possible by improvements in
French strategic nuclear forces, both in numbers of warheads
and accuracy, especially in the submarine leg of the triad.
Modernizations have not and probably will not for the
forseeable future change France's declared counter-value
targeting policy. The French are likely to continue with a
strategy that is not counter-force and does not threaten
Soviet strategic forces; doing otherwise might encourage a
Soviet desire to preempt French forces in a crisis. As
Capt. John J. Hyland, USN, has pointed out, French strategic
modernizations have expanded the range of targets France can
now threaten [Ref. 78:p. 79]. This in turn has changed
France's deterrent measure of effectiveness from simple
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proportional assured destruction to a complex threat to the
Soviet civil and economic infrastructure [Ref. 78:pp.
79-80]. Improved survivability of the counter-value element
in French deterrence continues to be emphasized; this is
evident in the primary focus of modernization efforts being
directed to the submarine programs.
b. Continuing Debate on Flexible Limited Options
The improvements in French strategic nuclear
systems in terms of warhead numbers, range, accuracy, and
survivability have prompted a debate over whether French
targeting plans should include flexible limited options.
The issue of targeting flexibility remains relatively
controversial in France. Several observers have suggested
that more flexible targeting of strategic forces might
enhance the credibility of French policy CRef. 20:p. 1413.
In particular, General Pierre Hautefeuille in 1980 argued
for targeting flexibility on the grounds that it reduced the
likelihood of se 1 f -deterrence , it provided an anti-cities
strategic nuclear reserve for intrawar deterrence and war
termination, and it offered the ability to respond in kind
and hence would help to deter Soviet limited strikes [Ref.
20:p. 1413. Limited French nulear strikes were not to be
understood as constituting a willingness to fight a nuclear
war, but rather like the tactical nuclear weapons, as a
warning to demonstrate French will and resolve to use
nuclear weapons against an aggressor. More recently in
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early 1988 Jacques Chirac suggested that the S-4 IRBMs could
be used to deliver an "ultimate warning" against the
"sanctuary" of the aggressor [Ref. 24:p. 3653.
However, French government spokesmen have
rejected the concept of flexible limited options for several
reasons. One is that France lacks the resources, both
financial and military, to build to credible levels of
strategic nuclear power for a policy of limited options
including counter-force [Ref. 20:p. 1423. Only an
anti-cities strategy, it is argued, is credibly within
France^s means.
We aim at the adversary's cities because these targets
are easy to reach, without great accuracy in the
missiles required, and especially because one can thus
cause important damage with a limited number of
weapons.... It is only in the framework of an
anti-cities strategy that the desirable level of damage
can be guaranteed with the means that remain in
proportion to the scientific, industrial, and economic
possibilities of France. Any other strategy would
necessitate much more important means, without doubt
beyond our reach, and could not but weaken deterrence.
[Ref. 79:pp. 24, 313
Another reason given by the government for
rejecting the idea of limited options for targeting is that
it conveys a sense of "manageable" French response and a
doubt that France would respond by carrying out an
"unthinkable" massive retaliation [Ref. 20:p. 1433. General
Lacaze summarized the argument as follows: "This idea
implies in itself a doubt in the presidential determination
to have recourse to strategic reprisals and, consequently.
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would lead to weakening the credibility of our deterrence by
the weak of the strong." ERef. 80:p. 123
Although the modernized strategic weapon systems
and C3 systems will offer improved capabilities for limited
strikes, French declaratory " an t i -c i t i es" , massive
retaliation targeting policy is unlikely to change
significantly in the near future. French policy-makers are
likely to continue to reject the idea of a flexible nuclear
response and instead continue to expand its counter-value
criteria and goals as newer, and more capable systems enter
the arsenal. The French declared operational policy will
probably remain as Adm. Jacques Bonnemaison, commander of
the Force Oceanique Strategique in 1983, figuratively
indicated, "We wouldn't operate in sausage slices. We give
them the entire sausage." CRef. 81:p. 28] A major factor
preventing a radical change in the French anti-cities
targeting policy may ultimately be, as David S. Yost has
concluded, that too much domestic political capital has been
invested in the policy, in terms of politics, bureaucracy,
and the military, for it to be altered readily [Ref. 20:p.
144] .
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IV. ADDITIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING MODERNIZATION DECISIONS
Factors other than strategic considerations have
influenced British and French nuclear force modernization.
Several of these factors are examined in this chapter.
Alternative modernization options that the two nations
considered are reviewed along with some of the reasons why
those alternative programs were rejected. Domestic politics
in both Britain and France significantly affected the course
of the modernization plans; the policies on defense and
nuclear weapons of the major political parties and the
effects of domestic public opinion are examined. Each
nation's economic base and technological capabilities are
considered. Lastly, perspectives concerning American
co-operation are examined.
A. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS CONSIDERED FOR MODERNIZATION IN THE
1980S AND 1990S
1 . Bri tain
Several other options were available to the British
at the time of the government ''s decision to proceed with the
Trident program. In January 1987 the Ministry of Defence
published a booklet explaining the misconceptions in
arguments that supported the case for an independent British
nuclear deterrent but which claimed that other systems were
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more appropriate and cost-effective for Britain [Ref. 82:pp.
1-9]. Several of these alternatives are discussed below.
Britain ruled out early in the decision-making
process any ground- 1 aunched systems. The primary concern
was that of their vulnerability to surprise attack, the same
concern that forced the cancellation of the technically
promising Blue Streak silo-based ballistic missile in 1960.
This concern was accentuated by Britain^'s small territory
and close proximity to Soviet land-based and sea-based
missiles. The government stated: "No ground- 1 aunched force
based in Britain could achieve the special standard of
invulnerability to surprise attack appropriate for our
ultimate strategic capability." [Ref. 44:p. 113
One of the options available to the British was to
replace its aging Polaris forces with submar i ne- 1 aunched
cruise missiies (SLCMs), namely one derived from the U.S.
Tomahawk .version. However, the maximum range of the
Tomahawk missile is 1,600 nautical miles compared to 4,000
to 6,000 nautica' miles for the Trident missile. The
government's assessment was that a British Trident submarine
would have approximately 15 times more sea room in which to
hide than a SLCM-firing submarine [Ref. 82:p. 2]. The use
of sea-based cruise missiles would have reduced the
operational effectiveness of the U.K. deterrent by forcing
the U.K. submarines carrying the nation's ultimate deterrent
into waters that could be strongly contested by Soviet ASW
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(anti-submarine warfare) forces. The Trident option, on the
other hand, made use of large tracts of ocean; this would
oblige Soviet ASW forces to deploy away from home bases
through areas dominated by British naval forces.
Given that cruise missiles carry only one warhead
where as the Trident is MIRVed and given that Soviet air
defenses are not limited by treaty and are rapidly being
strengthened with look-down shoot-down fighters,
surface-to-air missiles, and increasingly capable satellite,
airborne, and ground sensor systems, it was calculated that
Britain would need at least 400 SLCMs at sea to provide the
assured minimum deterrent equivalent to a deployed Trident
system. For the foreseeable future, the British government
considered ballistic missile warheads much less vulnerable
to interception than cruise missile warheads.
Moreover, the Ministry of Defence judged that
dedicated submarines would be required to carry Britain^s
SLCMs, primarily because the British SSN (nuclear attack
submarine) fleet is too small and already fully committed to
other missions and somewhat vulnerable by having to sail in
harm''s way. The Defence Open Government Document 82/1
stated:
The alternative of installing very small numbers of
cruise missiles on our existing hunter-killer submarines
(SSNs) also makes little sense; apart from the doubtful
deterrent value of such a small force, the role of the
SSNs as our most powerful anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
system is totally incompatible with that required of a
strategic deterrent force, both in deployment area and
nature of operations. To hold back our SSN force for a
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strategic role would effectively make it impossible for
it to fulfill its crucially important ASW function.
[Ref. 13:p. 4]
It was noted that, although some U.S. SSNs carry SLCMs, they
do not provide the United States^ sole strategic deterrent.
To achieve the same effects of the Trident deterrent the
following rationale was used to figure the number of
dedicated cruise missile submarines required:
To achieve the deployment of the 400 SLCM''s needed to
match the deterrence effect of Trident would require a
force of 5 SSCNs on patrol at all times, assuming 80
missiles per submarine. To maintain 5 SSCNs on patrol
requires 8 in the operating cycle, and this, allowing
for a 25% margin of missiles in maintenance would
involve the purchase of 800 SLCMs. In order to run a
viable operating and refit cycle, a total force of 11
SSCNs would be needed to sustain 5 submarines on patrol.
[Ref. 82:p. 4]
In a similar train of reasoning, it was Judged that
a large number of air-launched cruise missiles would be
required to match the striking power of the Trident force.
In addition, more airfields, support facilities, and
hardened shelters would be required, thereby necessitating a
very substantial investment in facilities and equipment. To
avoid using aircraft already in service with conventional
missions, dedicated nuclear delivery aircraft would have to
be bought, again an expensive proposition. Even so, such a
deterrent force would still be vulnerable on the ground at
known airfield locations. Continuous airborne patrols were
deemed too costly in terms of resources and manpower and
were therefore rejected. The Defence Open Government
Document 87/01 stated, "Furthermore, to have RAF nuclear
armed aircraft on permanent patrol in and around UK airspace
would be unprecedented and inherently undesirable." [Ref.
82:p. 6] A previous government document stated, "Moreover,
no British Government " wou 1 d want to have numerous nuclear
weapon carriers constantly airborne, year in and year out in
crowded airspace above and around our small country." [Ref.
44:p. 11] Furthermore, permanently airborne forces could
not be sustained long if the support airfields were
destroyed and the government did not want to find itself in
the compelling situation to launch its ultimate capability
in response to strikes on airfields [Ref. 44:p. 113.
The British government also examined the possibility
of replacing Polaris by a French missile. However, the only
possible missile, the M-5, was Just beginning development
and would not have been available on the same timescale as
Trident, thereby running the risk of prolonged reliance on
an ineffective and aging Polaris force or suffering a gap in
deterrent capability. Besides, the adaption of the nuclear
warheads to the French missile and redesign to the submarine
would increase both the costs and delays. Therefore to meet
the mid-1990s in-service date the Trident program was the
most cost-effective option for meeting the U.K.^s
requirement for a minimum deterrent to succeed
Polaris/Cheval ine. [Ref. 82:p. 8]
Although it was considered feasible for British
industry to develop and build ballistic missiles, this was
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not an attractive option due to cost. Refurbishing the old
Polaris missiles and missile support equipment was evaluated
as too costly and as likely to provide too little
reliability, as the Chevaline experience suggested. Any
modernization program which kept the Polaris missiles or
bought the Poseidon system would have meant substantial
costs to Britain, because Britain would have to bear all the
expenses of continuing support for systems being phased out
of the U.S. arsenal. The Trident system was chosen partly
because it was likely to remain in the United States'
service for many years, during which all the economies of
commonality wou 1 a be available to Britain [Ref. 44:p. 20 3.
Also considered were options for sea-launch from
surface ships. However, these options were deemed not to be
significantly cheaper for a given missile-carrying
capability, speed, or endurance. Surface ships would also
have been more vulnerable to enemy tracking than submarines.
Diesel suomarines were also studied as a replacement for the
nuc 1 ear-powerec boats now in service. Although quieter than
nuclear suomarines when operating on battery power, the
diesel submarines would have been vulnerable to detection
when on the surface or snorkel ing to recharge the batteries.
It was also considered not feasible to build a large diesel
submarine with sufficient electrical power to carry a
substantial number of missiles. Therefore, a large number
of small submarines would have driven up the cost in
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resources and manpower as well as in developing an
infrastructure and support industry in an area in which the
Unitea States hao chosen not to proceed. Although diesel
submarines could have operated close to shore, that was
considered too vulnerable to mining. Therefore, nuclear
ocean-going submarines were oeemed the best launch platforms
for a British missile force, [Ref. 44:p. 13]
2. France
The alternative options considered for French
modernization ao not seem as extensive as those for the
British primarily because the French modernization programs
ao not involve replacement of the entire deterrent force
with one weapon system and because it was more reasonable to
continue existing systems deployment patterns and to
unaertake technological upgrades. No major confrontational
deoate took place over whether the French would mooernize
their submarine ana ai r-de 1 i vered weapons systems; it was
rather a question of how many would be bu i 1 t . 2 ^^ expensive
research and development and industrial infrastructure was
already in place. Therefore it was not cost-effective to
^See Chapter IV, Section B. "France", for a discussion
of the political debates in France over nuclear
modernization options.
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unaertdKe racical, experimental new weapon systems that
might entail enormous expenses ana a possible technological
deaoenc.
In 1980 the main deoate focused on how many
additional SSBlis to Ouilo. Some Gaullists wantea 15 SSBNs
oy the year 2000 out the Socialist government seemed to hold
the celief that more than seven or eight SSBNs Dy the turn
of the century wou 1 a be unreasonaole oecause it would leao
France away from wnat Mitterrand called her estaoiished
sufficient capacity for deterrence ana wou 1 c entail
targeting seconcary targets at the expense to France of
additional personne:. support. ana infrastructure [Ref.
28:p. 21j. Nonetheless, the Mitterrand administration has
placea pr.cr.t, on suomarine strategic moaern i zat i on at the
expense of lano-Oaseo improvements. Mitterranc him.seif saio
in Cctooer 1988, 'We are miOoernizing m priority our
Daliist.c miss.ie nuclear suomiarines. the pr inc. pie
component [of the French nuclear force], their weapons,
their p;Eittorms ana tneir communications in oroer to
preserve tneir i nvu 1 neraol i ty . " [Ref. 64:p. 17]
It should De noteo that the French have chosen not
to develop a follow on strategic oomber to the Dassault
Mirage IV whicn is programmed to be phased out of aeplcyment
in the m,ia-i990s. Although the ASM? missile on Mirage 2000
Ns compensates somewhat for this loss, French aefense
planners nave apparently rejected the option of pursuing a
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new generation of manned penetrating strategic bomber. It
has been suggested that this may be due to concerns over
subjecting French personnel to the hazards of effective
Soviet air defenses and an unwillingness (driven by fiscal
restraints) to invest in expensive countermeasures and
aircraft design to improve penetration capability [Ref.
24:p. 20]. Instead the French have decided to rely on a
medium-range stand off missile to the demise of the air leg
of France's defense triad. Defense Minister Chevenement has
also referred to the possibility of Developing a long-range
air-delivered missile, but has said that this is "scarcely
foreseeable before the year 2000." [Ref. 83:p. 11]
The only real list of alternative options for French
nuclear modernization has been centered around the IRBM
upgrade question. These alternatives originally focused on
its basing mode (fixed silo or road-mobile), and the options
were rooted in political and doctrinal considerations.
Although a road-mobile system offered the advantage of
enhanced survivability, there were concerns that nuclear
weapons trucked about the French countryside would frighten
people and contribute to undermining the French consensus
regarding nuclear weapons and their employment [Ref. 33:p.
9]. Furthermore, since enemy destruction of fixed IRBMs in
hardened silos would require a direct attack on French
"sanctuar ized" territory. Justification for nuclear
retaliation would be relatively uncontroversi al [Ref. 28:p.
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20]. "An attack on [the plateau of] Albion would signify
that we were already at war, nuclear war. By the same
token, the launch of our strategic nuclear forces would be
instantaneous. We would not have time to philosophize."
CRef. 64:p. 17] Maintenance of a land-based system is also
seen as a hedge against possible technological breakthroughs
that might Jeopardize the other components of the French
nuclear forces [Ref. 64:p. 17].
The French did have the option of pursuing a
ground- 1 aunched cruise missile system rather than a
ballistic one. Reasons for the French rejecting a cruise
missile system included: the prohibitive costs of producing
sufficient inventories to saturate Soviet air defenses, the
strategic warning time that the long flight profiles of
cruise missiles would offer to Soviet authorities, and the
lack of adequate French satellite mapping capability for
cruise missile guidance systems [Ref. 28:pp. 20-21]. It has
been suggested that the French opted for the ballistic
missile oelivery vehicle because it offered substantial
throwweight, the possibility of deploying multiple warheads,
and better prospects for penetration of Soviet defenses; it
was also within French technological and fiscal capabilities
[Ref. 28:p.21]. However, with the IRBM program currently on
hold with a minimal research and development program,
fundamental questions as to whether the missile force on the
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Plateau d'Albion should be modernized at all appear to be
unanswered.
B. MODERNIZATIONS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
1. Britain
a. Conservative Party
The Conservative Party in Britain has
traditionally supported a strong defense establishment with
the perspective that Britain should play a powerful role in
world affairs. A dominant theme running throughout the
party's politics is the power and prestige that nuclear
weapons confer upon Britain. Emphasized in party rhetoric
is the need to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent.
This is evident in the Conservative government's staunch
advocacy of Trident and in the 1983 Conservative manifesto,
which promised to "...maintain our own independent nuclear
contribution to British and European deterrence." [Ref. 84]
Because most Tory MPs have a strong pro-defense
orientation, periodic conflicts have arisen within the party
regarding support for an independent nuclear deterrent at
the expense of conventional forces. Some within the party
feel that the program is a duplication of effort, and that
because Britain is fully under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, it
should redirect its resources to sea lane protection and
out-of-area capabilities [Ref. 85:p. 51]. Arguments for
more conventional defense within the party have had the
effect not of threatening the cancellation of the Trident
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prograrr.. Dut rather of increasing overall defense budgets or
of arresting aeclining expenditures on the Royal Navy, as in
1982 following the Falklands conflict. In sum, the
Conservatives are divided over the amount of resources that
should De oevoted to the nuclear deterrent, not over the
need for a nuclear deterrent.
The Conservative Party is clearly associated
with tne fundamental principles of British postwar defense
policy, including multilateralism and strong support for
NATO, possession of an indepenoent nuclear deterrent force,
and aepioyment of American nuclear weapons on Br i t i sn soil.
The Conservative manifesto for the 1987 elections stated,
"Only tne Conservative party stands oy the aefence policy
whicn every postwar government has seen to be necessary ana
wnich has Kept tne peace of Europe for more than a
generation' . [Ref. 86:p, 71-721 With an overwhelming
victory in 198~ ana the next elections not expecteo until
1991 or 1992. tne Conservatives witn general party consensus
are iiKeiy to continue a strong policy of defense and
pursuit of the Triaent program. In the future, nowever
,
such a policy of ail -around contribution to NATO may become
more difficult to sustain for fiscal reasons and may spark





Tne Labour Party's first postwar government made
the initial decision to build British nuclear weapons and a
strategic bomber force. Although the Conservatives in 1962
made the Polaris procurement decision, subsequent Labour
governments have adhered to the decision and have made
important modernization commitments (e.g., Chevaline) as
well. But by 1980, with the Trident decision, the British
bipartisan consensus on nuclear issues had clearly
collapsed, with the two parties widely separated on
theoretical and ideological approaches to nuclear policy.
The Labour Party suffers from friction between
Its right and left wings, ana nuclear policy has Deen
particularly unsettling ana divisive. The party's left-wing
faction views nuclear weapons deployment as immoral, as
likely to increase the probability of war, and as a waste of
British resources, which could be (in their view) better
devoted toward building a socialist state. This faction
often supports pacifism and has championed within the party
the policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament. The right
wing of the party draws support from some sectors of the
trade union movement and tends to be more pragmatic; it
focuses more on domestic economic problems than on nuclear
issues. The result has been a frequently shifting policy,
the most recent turn having come at the Labour Party
Conference in October 1989. [Ref. 41 :p. 47]
Since Labour^s defeat in the 1979 elections, the
party's political power has shifted dramatically toward the
left due to procedural and structural changes within the
party. This move to the political left of the party's power
base has placed Labour increasingly at odds with
Conservative positions regarding defense and nuclear
weapons. Since 1980 Labour has called for the dismantling
of Britain's own nuclear forces and the elimination of U.S.
nuclear weapons facilities in Britain. At the 1982 party
conference Labour s anti-nuclear policy was one of:
Opposing unconditionally, the replacement of Polaris by
Trident or any other system, and the deployment of
cruise missiles, neutron bombs and all other nuclear
weapons in Britain....
Closing down all nuclear bases, British or American, on
British soil or in British waters. [Ref. 87]
In the 1983 and 1987 election campaigns Labour promised, if
elected, to cancel the Trident procurement in a unilateral
nuclear disarmament move and to allocate the money saved to
conventional forces. Labour was defeated by the
Conservatives decisively in both elections, due in large
part (it IS widely believed) to Labour's defense policy.
In early October 1989 at its party conference,
the Labour Party voted to scrap the unilateralist defense
policy. Left-wing party members accused the leadership of
selling their souls for the chance of winning an election.
[Ref. 88:p. 48]. Many observers have viewed this move as a
pragmatic step in Labour leader Neil Kinnock's reform
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program to improve the party^s chances of winning the next
election. In criticizing Labour-'s defense policy, even
Conservative Prime Minister Thatcher acknowledged it as a
pragmatic move when she declared that Labour''s policy was
not "...a defense policy to see Britain through the 21st
century and beyond. It^s a form of words to see the Labour
Party through the next election." [Ref. 89]
A Labour government would, the party leadership
says, keep three Trident submarines, because it would be
more costly to cancel them than to complete them and they
would be used as bargaining counters with the Soviets to
increase prospects for world nuclear disarmament [Ref. 90:p.
11. Labour leaders reasoned that a unilateral removal of
nuclear weapons could be reversed by a subsequent
government, but a treaty signed on behalf of Britain by a
Labour government could not [Ref. 90:p. 1]. Labour^s "new
realism" would also accept the U.S. nuclear umbrella, end
British nuclear testing, cut £5 billion from the defense
budget, call on NATO to renounce first-use of nuclear arms,
oppose modernization of NATO^s short-range nuclear weapons
and support Gorbachev in a pledge to eliminate all nuclear
weapons from the world by the year 2000 [Ref. 90:p. 1; Ref.
91; Ref. 92:p. A3]. On the three existing Tridents Labour
would keep the number of nuclear warheads down to the 32
carried on one boat load of existing Polaris missiles [Ref.
93] .
Although Labour-'s defense policy has stiffened,
it is far from hawkish and could bring about the elimination
of Britain's independent strategic nuclear forces through
cancellation of further construction and nuclear testing,
and arms control negotiation. A bipartisan consensus
between the Conservative and Labour parties regarding an
independent nuclear strategic force is still absent.
c. Prospects for Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament
The prospects for British unilateral nuclear
disarmament now appear remote at best. For much of the
1980s the Labour Party was committed to unilateral
disarmament. Had Labour been voted into office, the
prospects would have been high that the Trident program
would have been cancelled. After three resounding defeats
at the polls. Labour leader Neil Kinnock announced in May
1989, "I am not again going to make that tactical argument
for the .unilateral, independent abandonment of nuclear
weapons without getting anything in return. I will not do
it." [Ref. 94 :p. 1]
Labour may no longer be committed to unilateral
nuclear disarmament, but it is still committed to nuclear
disarmament. Ken Livingstone, a left-wing party member,
summarized the party division over nuclear weapons as
follows: "We all accept that the whole objective of the
party is to try to achieve the removal of all nuclear
weapons. What we disagree about is the best way of
achieving that." [Ref. 94:p. 1] The party has pledged to
incorporate British nuclear weapons, including three Trident
submarines, into superpower arms control negotiations with
the objective of obtaining greater concessions from Moscow.
Labour leaders met with Soviet authorities in February 1989
and received Moscow's backing for the view that Britain
should play a larger role in multilateral disarmament. [Ref.
95:p. 1] However, a "reality" of the situation also was
that by 1992, because of deliberately built-in penalty
clauses, only cancellation of the fourth Trident hull would
be cost-effective, and would result in saving less than
f350-f450 million [Ref. 3:p. xiv].
Having discarded one of its greatest electoral
liabilities (unilateral nuclear disarmament), Labour now
appears potentially capable of threatening continued Tory
rule in the 1990s. Should Labour'^s defense policy be
implemented, it would probably not be called unilateral
disarmament, but it might eventially have the same net
effect: the reduction or elimination of British nuclear
weapons (including Trident). Labour-'s goal is multilateral
nuclear disarmament, but it remains to be seen if this will
be feasible.
d. Pub! ic Opinion
Post-1983 election analysis has shown that the
percentage of voters who regard defense and nuclear weapons
as the most important issue facing Britain has remained
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steady at between 20 percent and 30 percent [Ref. 96:p. 3],
In December 1986 it had been 26 percent [Ref 96:p. 3].
Although this may seem small, it is a historically high
figure for the postwar period, and in fact, defense has been
the second concern behind unemployment [Ref. 96:p. 33. It
has been noted that the high unemployment concern (78
percent) has not been translated into votes for Labour at
elections, whereas Conservative positions on defense issues
have contributed to election victories. Hence, defense
remains a major ;ssue in British politics.
There is some evidence of a slight shift in
popular opinion in Britain regarding the continued need for
the British nuclear deterrent force in the context of
superpower nuclear force reductions. A December 1986 Harris
survey for TV/AM showed that 70 percent disagreed that the
United Kingdom should rid itself of its nuclear weapons,
whereas 24 percent agreed [Ref. 97:p. 1143. A MORI survey
conducted in March 198^ posed the question whether Britain
should get rid of its deterrent even in the event of a
superpower agreement to cut nuclear forces; 21 percent
favored scrapping the nuclear deterrent force, 36 percent
favored some reduction in British nuclear forces, and only
33 percent favored no change in Britain's nuclear deterrent
forces [Ref. 98:p. 7]. If there were no nuclear weapons by
the year 2000 (a position supported by Labour), 37 percent
responded that Britain would be safer than today and 39
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percent felt Britain would be as safe as today [Ref. 98:p.
73. The postwar political consensus that the British
nuclear deterrent is a necessary instrument in maintaining
peace in Europe seems to be eroding. Some sources suggest
that British public opinion appears to be moving toward a
del egi
t
imizat ion of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons.
This shift in British public opinion regarding nuclear
weapons is attributed in large part to a reduced perceived
threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact [Ref. 98:p. 7].
The Labour Party^s shift on defense policy from
unilateral nuclear disarmament to a multilateral commitment
is likely to pick up votes. Polls suggest that about
two-thirds of the Conservatives support nuclear deterrence
and that two-thirds of Labour voters favor a non-nuclear
defense policy [Ref. 96:p. 2]. An ICM poll conducted in May
1989 revealed that 40 percent of the Labour voters
questioned said a switch to a multilateral nuclear
disarmament commitment would make them more likely to vote
Labour, and only eight percent said it would make them less
likely to do so [Ref. 99:p. 11. Twelve percent of those
planning to vote for other parties said they would be more
likely to consider voting for Labour if it switched to
multilateralism [Ref. 99:p. 11. One in three Democrats and
Social Democrats would likely vote for Labour if it switched
to multilateralism [Ref. 99:p. 13.
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Public support for Labour over the Conservatives
has definitely increased in 1989. In January 1989 polls
showed Conservatives with 44 percent and Labour with 40
percent [Ref. 99:p. 1]. By May 1989 both parties were even
with 43 percent [Ref. 99:p. 13. Results of the June 1989
European elections revealed voting for the Conservatives at
34 percent and for Labour at 39 percent [Ref. 100:p. 463.
At the Conservative Party conference in mid-October 1989
polls had the Conservatives five to ten percentage points
behinc the opposition Labour Party [Ref. 101:p. 43.
Elections do not have to be called until 1992 and the
Conservatives hope to regain public favor by then, but the
Conservatives seem likely to face a more formidable Labour
opponent on economic and defense issues than in the last
three elections.
2. France
a. Soc i al i st Party
French defense policy under the Socialists has
been characterized by continuity rather than change,
consensus rather than confrontation. The Socialists have in
general carried out the programs inaugurated under Giscard
d'Estaing in the late 1970s. However, in their
articulations of nuclear doctrine, the Socialists have
appeared to have taken the Gaul list mantle. [Ref. 71:p. 3113
Socialist President Franyois Mitterrand holds
that deterrence will be effective if the West threatens
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strikes deep into the Soviet heartland with strategic
nuclear weapons [Ref. 102:p. 9]. The priority is being
placed on the sea-based leg with new submarines, more
warheads, and longer-range missiles. Mitterrand has
rejected proposals to modernize the IRBMs in the near-term
as a waste of scarce defense resources. Although Mitterrand
does not support the S-4 mobile land-based system,
Mitterrand may eventually pursue development of a
longer-range version of the ASMP to meet France^s strategic
needs [Ref , 102:p. 83
.
Many Socialists have been uncomfortable with
tactical nuclear weapons because of the implications of a
nuclear battlefield limited to Europe. There is a
non-belligerency, non-war emphasis toward deterrence and
nuclear weapons in general. The Socialists even renamed
French tactical nuclear weapons as " pre-strategi c" nuclear
weapons in order to de-emphasize the notion of a limited
nuclear strike and to stress instead the massive retaliation
nature of a French nuclear response. The essence of French
nuclear doctrine, as expounded by the Socialists, Is
deterrence
.
Under fiscal and economic pressures to reduce
projected defense spending, the Socialists justify their
plans to cut some defense programs drastically (such as S-4)
and maintain others (such as Le Tr iomphant and M-5 SLBM
development and construction) as necessary in order for
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France in the twenty-first century to be internationally
credible m three areas: military, economic and social, and
monetary [Ref. 103:p. 14]. The Socialists argue that their
current defense plans anticipate the future environment, yet
at the same time maintain programs demanded by the French
defense consensus. This consensus rests on three
fundamental principles: the existence of an independent and
credible strategic nuclear force controlled exclusively by
the President of the Republic, French membership in the
Atlantic Alliance based on conventional forces independent
of the integrated NATO structure but dedicated to the
support of the alliance in the event of aggression, and the
means for long-range power projection of its forces to
protect global French interests [Ref. 103:p. 14]. Hence,
the Socialists are likely to seek increased interdependence
for French security policy but to continue to defend
France's .efforts to modernize its own independent strategic
nuclear deterrent.
b. RPR and UDF
The right-wing Gaul 1 ist Rassembl ement pour 1 a
Republ ique (RPR) has emphasized the primacy of France's
independent nuclear force and the secondary role of
conventional forces in deterring the Soviets. Credible
deterrence is believed to depend on a secure second-strike
strategic force. Gaul lists have generally advocated a
significant increase in the French strategic arsenal, namely
strategic nuclear submarines and mobile land-based missiles.
Jacques Chirac during his presidential campaign of 1981
called for 15 SSBNs by the year 2010 [Ref. 71:p, 3123. Also
in an alternative mil'itary program law for 1984-1988 RPR
proposed nine SSBNs be operational by 1994 [Ref. 66:p. 933.
Francois Fillon, one of RPR's most prominent defense
experts, argued that France could support eight or nine
SSBNs and should seek to implement that goal [Ref. 66:p.
93]. Some analysts associated with the RPR such as Pierre
Lei louche have insisted that five French SSBNs at sea is the
minimum number for credibility [Ref. 71 :p. 3123. The RPR
generally advocates increased defense spending; in 1984 the
party called for an increase in the defense budget to five
percent of the gross domestic product [Ref. 71 :p. 3123. To
pay for this military program the Gaul lists would have
France reduce its tactical nuclear investments; some
Gaul lists believe that recent modernization programs for
these weapons imply a battlefield rather than pre-strategi
c
role. However, Jacques Chirac in his 1988 presidential
campaign, against some party oppostion, argued for a more
explicit role for tactical nuclear weapons for a de facto
extended deterrence [Ref. 102:p. 83.
Jacques Chirac as president of the RPR has
denounced what he perceives as Mi tterrand'' s overemphasis in
an SSBN-based strategic force. It was Chirac^s government
during the 1986-1988 cohabitation period which proposed the
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mobile missile SX project Cnow S-4) opposed by Mitterrand.
Chirac in June 1989 criticized the Socialists for, in his
view, gravely undermining the French deterrent by extending
the planned service of France-'s vulnerable fixed silo-based
IRBMs and by placing the S-4 project on hold. A mobile
land-based missile, he argued, would add a second modern
component to French strategic nuclear forces and an
important European dimension which the force currently
lacks. In reference to the Socialist emphasis on SSBN force
modernization he accused the government of making a mistake
by relying solely on a "nuclear stronghold" for defense
rather than contributing to the principle of a European
pillar of defense. [Ref. 104:p. 181
The Un i on pour 1 a Democrat i e Franca i se (UDF), a
centrist coalition of small political parties, has
emphasized France's need to solidly support the Alliance.
The UDF has frequently accused the Mitterrand administration
of over : nvest 1 ng in nuclear forces. "The decision to give
increased priority to nuclear arms... in a reduced budget
package is likely to produce a purely illusory
'sanctuar : zat 1 on' of defense whose inevitable result is
neutralism in Europe and impotence in the world." [Ref.
1051. The UDF has maintained that the continued extensive
strategic nuclear force investments, "a new Maginot line",
will erooe French conventional forces dramatically in the
future [Ref. 66:p. 961.
In contrast to the RPR, the UDF has stressed the
importance of French tactical nuclear weapons. In the 1988
presidential campaign Raymond Barre favored an extended
deterrence role for French forces through modernization of
battlefield nuclear weapons CRef. 102:p. 8]. The UDF has
held that modernized tactical nuclear weapons would
constitute a more effective deterrent than the strategic
nuclear forces because their threatened use would be more
credible, [Ref, 71 :p. 313]. Barre also expressed
reservations about a primarily SSBN-based strategic force,
and some UDF advisors have suggested cancelling some French
independent programs in favor of more collaborative ones
with Alliance members such as a British-French sea-launched
missile system or a joint Franco-German neutron bomb venture
[Ref. 102:pp. 8-9]. The UDF has generally opposed nuclear
modernization programs that would result in increased range
of weapons, believing instead that nuclear weapons should be
deployed on the front lines, particularly in view of French
perceptions of pressures within NATO for a no-first-use
policy and alliance division over short-range nuclear
modernization [Ref. 71:pp. 313-314].
It was during the Giscard d'Estaing
administration in the late 1970s that the "enlarged
sanctuary" concept was proposed in an attempt to show some
form of solidarity with France^s European neighbors. The
UDF has viewed French security as residing not so much in
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the possession of independent strategic nuclear forces as in
co-operation and co-ordination with NATO forces at the
conventional and tactical nuclear levels.
c. Prospects for Consensus on Nuclear Weapons
Issues
The decision by the Socialist Party to support
nuclear deterrence in 1978 has been identified as one of the
key factors that made the French defense consensus possible
[Ref. 106:p. 221. For the last decade French officials have
consistently upheld the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence as
a means to prevent war and assure France''s independence and
international status. Even during the 1988 presidential
election, the candidates were in broad agreement on the
fundamentals of French defense policy. However, there were
some nuances of difference among the candidates on nuclear
weapon issues. The most noteworthy differences concerned
the S-4 mobile land-based system (the Plateau d'Albion
modernization) and the role of French pre-strategi c nuclear
forces. Pobbin Laird has suggested that these nuances
reflected in political party platforms may in the future
become large fissures in the defense consensus, especially
if public opinion swings to demand defense expenditure
reductions [Ref. 102:p. 83. David S. Yost has also
identified evidence of fragility in the consensus [Ref.
106:p. 23]. French officials have often sought to minimize
public discussion of possible selective employment concepts
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for the strategic forces partly due to fears of unaermining
the consensus [Ref . 106:p. 233.
Socialist President Francois Mitterrand won a
secono term in office in 1988 but was denied a majority in
the parliament. In the European elections of June 1989 the
Socialists made slight gains over their previous seating,
but with only 24 percent of the vote [Ref. 100:p. 463. Some
French Socialist leaders have indicated that the party may
be increasingly susceptible to pressures to join the
European socialist and social democratic mainstream
positions on security, namely detente and arms control
priorities rather than an emphasis on military preparedness
[Ref. 106:p. 233. Should the party follow sucn a security
policy and the president and prime minister oe forced to
govern from the position of a minority government, a
significant breakdown in the oefense consensus could indeed
occur in France.
It IS unlikely that French officials would
forsake the primacy of strategic nuclear weapons m French
defense policy simply due to the tremenoous amount: of
political and military capital that has been invested in the
strategic nuclear weapons and their associated doctrine.
However, the status of the defense consensus may affect the
future force m.ix. Mitterand and the Socialists most likely
will probably continue to emphasize the SSBN-based strategic
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force moaern i zat 1 on at the expense of the other nuclear
forces on the grounds that it is survivaDle, mobile, and a
cost-effective independent deterrent for France. In
addition, oy oasing its future independent strategic nuclear
deterrent force largely on submarines, France might more
easily avoid a public revision of French nuclear doctrine
that might potentially further undermine the consensus.
French cfficals could instead continue to play on the
doctrinal ambiguities.
But in a future riddled with strategic
uncertainties, the right ana center parties may be able to
mount increasingly credible opposition to a defense policy
whicn has France placing all of her eggs in one basket, so
to speaK . Instead, the argument is likely to oe for more
diversification of launcher platforms (such as the S-4) and
more flexioility in force structure, targeting, and
employment options csuch as a longer-range ASMP to enhance
deterrence). Such a force mix would require France to
clarify its policy for both domestic and foreign audiences.
A future environment of a lessened threat perception from
the East and of increasing demands to move French resource
allocations away from defense sectors is likely to reveal
and exacerbate clear rifts in the defense consensus
regarding nuclear weapons and is likely to lead eventually
to Its demise.
d. Publ ic Opinion
A reduction in the threat perception from the
East IS likely to underpin a reduction in puDlic support tor
defense. A Gallup opinion poll published in early 1988
revealed that 51 percent of the French approved of the
modernization of French nuclear forces as opposed to 56
percent in 1986 tRef. 102:p. 7]. Only 24 percent believed
in the real possibility of a nuclear attack against France
and a mere six percent feared a conventional attack t::)'^ the
Soviet Union against France [Ref, 102:p. 83. One in two
Frencnmen favoreo French participation in nuclear arms
control talKS as long as the two superpowers continue
reductions m their respective nuclear arsenals [Ref.
102:p.83
.
The Gcroachev diplomatic initiatives and
U.S. -Soviet progress on strategic nuclear arms reductions
are likely to have a continuing effect on French puDlic
opinion as illustrated by the trends from 1986 to 1988.
Although there may oe a broad consensus on defense issues
among the major political parties in France (with the
exception of the French Communist Party), the political
elite may face increasing difficulties in maintaining public
support for a strong defense and nuclear weapons
modern i zat i on
.
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C. TECHNOLOGY', ECONOMY, AND DEFENSE SPENDING
1
. Br 1 tain
7ne neea ro incorporate national technology into the
weapon systerr: aia not enter into the modernization aecision
for the Briiisn to tne extent that it aid for the French.
It was not advances in British technology that drove the
Trident aecision out rather the technical dDSdlescence of an
aging weapon system. That is not to say that British
techno! ogica ; advances have oeen trivial or that they are
not Deing employed. Chevaline has been aescrioeo as a
"remarKaoie rec.-.nicai achievement.' [Ref. 2:p. 21 J Nor is
there any question or British capaoility to produce MIRVs
[Ref. 2:p. 113]. National manufacture of the mnssiles was
apparently not oeyond Br i t i sn industrial or technological
means either. British Aerospace Dynamics wnicn nao
recomrrienoec oallistic over cruise missiies nad originally
propcsea tnat sciio-fuel missile aevelopment be unaerta<en
immed.ately :Ref. 2:p. 114].
Associated costs with sucn a program., however, were
thought to De pronio.tive ana unpreai ctaol e . Tne Cnevalme
program, had demonstrateo now inherently expensive 'united
Kingdom unique strategic weapons innovations would oe . The
British oeiievec it to oe in their best interest to remain
"in sync' with Am.erican development and aeployment programis;
and shoula later m.odi f i cat i ons be necessary. Britain would
enjoy the economic oenefits of cc i 1 aborat i ve research,
development. anc procuremient , By purchasing tne Trident
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system, Britain saves the cost of creating an inaustnal
rocket infrastructure ana test ranges while maintaining
access to state-of-the-art technology in that area. From a
technological aspect the dominant factor in the Trident
decision was to maintain commonality with American
developments and deployments to reduce costs.
The Conservatives' argument for Trident, which were
based largely on cost considerations, exemplifies a basic
dilemma of postwar British defense policy; domestic economic
growth has not kept pace with the continual rise of the real
costs of defense. When the Thatcher government came to
power It was comiiiittea to making defense a priority and
pledged to increase defense expenoiture by three percent per
year. However, according to the 1988 defence estimates the
defense budget was planned to be held roughly level in real
terms between 1988-89 and 1990-91 [Ref. 9:p. 36j . As early
as 1986 Secretary of State for Defence George Younger had to
acknowledge a declining real value in the defense buaget
which forcec aifficult choices over relative priorities
[Ref. 107:p. 40 J . With the re-elected Thatcher government
unwavering in its support for Trident and its funding, the
haraships have fallen on British conventional forces. Most
of the criticism against Trident budget-wise has been not
that the Conservatives negotiated a necessarily bad deal but
rather in the opportunity costs to Britain that Trident
represents.
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Introducing Trident at the expense of conventional
capaDi i 1 t 1 es
. some critics have argued, may have the
strategic effect of lowering the nuclear threshold in Europe
[Ref. i08:p. 22]. Mr. John Stanley, Minister of State for
the Armea Forces, stdtea in June 1984:
It IS claimed that if we have Trident we shall have to
cut DacK on conventional weapons, but that, I suggest,
misses the key point. The central question is not
whether if we have Trident we shall have less to spend
on conventional weapons— that is obviously the case
—
but whether the sum of money to be spent on Trident will
be a better addition to Britain^'s and NATO's defenses
than the same sum of money spent on conventional
weapons. That is the key question, and... our view is
that the s^^iii being spent on Trident will give us an
amount of deterrence which we could not possibly get by
spending tne sarr;e sum on conventional weapons. [Ref.
109 :p. 176]
According to David Greenwood's calculations and
hypctr.esis. tnere is a widening funding gap between the
resources req>^ired and the relatively level funding
allocated to sustain a British defense effort (or "output")
along current lines witn provisions for modernization [Ref.
107:pp. 66-6&: . He estimated that by 1991 there will be a
2i percent, or £5.3 billion, difference between the funds
aiiocatec for defense ano the funds required to maintain
Britcins current force structure [Ref. 107:p. 67].
Although Trident may not be the cause of this defense
unoerf undi ng , it has been pointed out that, because Trident
expenditures are equivalent to half the overall underfunding
for 1987-1988 and 1988-1989, Trident cancellation has been
identified as a partial quick fix (albeit temporary; to
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Brita.in 3 defense fundiriQ dilemmd. [Ret. l07tp. 73], Some
Tory critics have also joined others in Britain asserting
that a wiser defense investment would resiae in
strengthening sea lane protection, out-of-area capabilities,
or land forces on the Continent. In other words, the
Trident program is perceived by many to be forcing Britain
(because of resource constraints) to redefine its defense
priorities and to choose between maintaining its present
naval strength or its land forces in Europe (British Army of
the Rh 1 ne )
.
Britain has pursued a variety of measures to resolve
Its defense funding problems. It has emphasizeo competition
in procurement, reduced force operational tempo, and
encouraged joint armaments ventures to procure the best
value of weapons for money. If the rising unemployment and
inflation visible in late 1989 continues, the Conservative
government will be under increasing pressure to provide more
funds for oomestic services and to freeze or reduce defense
spenomg. Unless the British economy improves dramatically
in the near-term with significant capital infusion and
modernization, some have argued, the British contribution to
NATO may have to be channeled toward selected tasks rather
than toward an insufficient all-around contribution,
especially in a period of leveling defense expenditures
coincident with the peak years of Trident expenditure.
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2. France
Or.e of the factors which has helped to shape the
airection of French nuclear modernization efforts has been
advances in French technology. Although some experts
believe that the French have not exploited the advantages of
the MIRV technology nor that they have achieved individual
re-entry vehicle guidance accuracy comparable to that of
American ana Soviet MIRV designs, the M-4 and M-5 programs,
nonetheless, represent significant improvements in the range
ana accuracy of French missiles as well as in improved
penetration capability of the warheaas [Ref. 25:p. 67; Ref
.
28:p. 22]. A major factor in the expansion of the French
strategic force s striKing power has been their ability to
fit tr.eir S33Ns v;itn multiple-warhead missiles. Similarly,
aavances in suomarine quieting technology and a decrease in
SSBN salvo firing time have been incorporated into the
1 n t ', e .-: . b i e arc nev; generation SSBNs. Although published
sources ac not inaicate that any French ballistic missile
system has aepresseo-tra j ectory capability, the term has
been mentioneo as a means of complicating Soviet oallistic
missile aefenses and as a possible requirement for a
replacement missile on the Plateau d'Albion [Ref. 24:p. 174;
Ref. 32:p. 143. This suggests that depressed-trajectory
capability may be within French technological and
engineering capacity. The ASMP air-launched attack missile
ana tne MIRAGE 200C N are also the products of advanced
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French aerospace technology and an industry with a QloDal
market. In oraer to possess a force with greater capability
to aeter the Soviets, the French must exploit their
technological capabilities. Therefore advances in French
technology can be seen as one of the driving factors behind
France's modernization programs.
Though the Socialist government is committed to a
strong defense policy, some economists predict that overall
French economic growth expectations are not high enough to
ensure the future maintenance of the French defense system.
Although some of the negative economic trends in the French
economy of the early 1980s have been reversed (namely
falling savings and investment rates, decreasing labor
productivity, and a high inflation differential between
France and its principal trading partners), the French
economy is still plagued by negative balance of trade
payments and government deficits [Ref. 110:p. 1883.
Projections by the Wharton Economic Forecasting Associates
indicate that the three percent average rate of growth of
the French econom.y needea to maintain French defense
spending as programmed by the Socialists in 1983 will not be
obtained [Ref. lll:p. 1621. The conflict between increasing
defense expenditures and the state of the economy, evident
throughout the early to mid-1980s, was reiterated by
President Fran9ois Mitterrand in October 1988, but the
commitment remained with defense.
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There is no solid defense without a healthy economy.
The economic and budgetary imbalance would thwart our
defer,se, wou 1 o compromise our security. The nation
consents to important sacrifices for the military budget
to the detriment of other sectors. Not only must this
be accepted but it must be announced, on the condition
of Keeping the necessary good sense and knowing how to
distinguish between what can and cannot be done. The
essential point is that our means of defense meet the
nature of the threats while at the same time the
evolution of techniques. [Ref. 64:p. 16]
In 1987 the five year program accepted by socialists
and the center-right government of Jacque Chirac set a
spencmg target on weapons to increase by six percent a year
after inflation; by 1989 this had fallen to 5.7 percent
[Ref. 21 :p. 54J. A review of the spending program was hela
in the spring of 198^. When the new programmat ion mi 1
i
taire
for 1990-1^93 was announced on 7 June 1989, military
spending for equipment was limited to four percent increase
per year after inflation [Ref. 32:p. 14]. Although the
reductions were aescribed by some critics as "catastrophic",
the text ot the military program aoded, "The on i y lasting
crediDie aefense is one which respects the economic
balances.' [Ref. Il2:p. 14] The Defense Minister sa i a in a
press conference following the announcement that the
"priority remained with the nuclear deterrent," but at the
same time he announceo a six-month delay in the submarine
Tr 1 omphant construction, reduction down to three squadrons
(45 planes) of Mirage 2000 Ns and postponement until at
least the turn of the century of decisions on the future of
the IR3M force [Ref. 27:p. 14].
Current spending on the modernization of the nuclear
forces is consuming 32 percent of the French military budget
[Ref. l:p. 29]. As the modernization progresses in the
1990s the share of the defense budget, especially its share
of the equipment budget, is expected to increase [Ref.
lll:p. 1621. In the face of pressures to increase spending
on conventional defenses and domestic programs, the
Socialist government has chosen to stretch out over longer
periods of time some of the nuclear programs. Clearly
France is feeing a fiscal dilemma. A recent Congressional
Research Report concluded that being committed absolutely to
their nuclear modernization program, the French must either
increase defense spending further to support a conventional
modernization program, or alter their projected force
structure, either conventional or nuclear [Ref. l:p. 313.
The French have been patient and persistent in their nuclear
weapons efforts in the past. It is unlikely that they will
cancel any nuclear projects, but rather (like past
govenments) will stretch procurements out with delays,
thereby maintaining a vital defense- i ndustr i al base and
easing fiscal and monetary pressures on the French economy,




Some have argued that the driving force behind the
British independent deterrent has been London-'s desire to
restore and maintain the special nuclear relationship with
Washington [Ref. 2:p. 46]. However, Peter Malone is
probably correct in assessing that Britain^'s deterrent
capability has been shaped mainly by security concerns. He
summar i zed,
...the Arr.erican connection has been primarily a
mechanism for maximizing the effectiveness and
minimizing the costs of that capability although
governments have unquestionably felt that nuclear
co-operation, as the central strand of a complex
bilateral relationship, yields pol 1 1 i cal -mi 1 i tary
influence [Ref. 2:p. 463.
The importance of Anglo-American co-operation in developing
a follow-on to Pol ar i s can be seen in the statements made
when the Tr:dert decision was announced.
Given that, as with Polaris, our operational
independence can remain unimpaired, there is great
financial advantage in the maximum possible commonality
with the United States, especially in view of their high
technology, the massive scale of their own missile
procurement and our long experience of working together
[Ref. 44:p. 9],
Since delivery-system technology rather than weapons
technology has become the most costly element of the
deterrent posture, Britain saves both time and money through
co-operative links with the United States.
It has also been suggested that it would have been
difficult indeed for the British government not to maintain
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the American connection and instead to pursue more European
co-operation; relinquishing it would have implied that some
fundamental reassessment of the British-American
relationship had taken place [Ref. 113:p. 9]. The
government also reasoned that collaboration with France or
any other venture to modernize its strategic nuclear
deterrent would show a lack of faith in NATO, and
particularly in the United States. There is no doubt that
the Anglo-American "special relationship" is highly valued
by both countries for its enduring mutual benefits. Note
the White House communique following Prime Minister
Thatcher's visit in December 1979:
The President and the Prime Minister agreed on the
importance of maintaining a credible British strategic
deterrent force and U.S. -U.K. strategic cooperation.
The leaders agreed that their governments should
continue their discussions of the most appropriate means
of achieving these objectives for the future. [Ref.
114;p.24]
Although cultural heritage links between the two
democracies, a common language, and past close co-operative
ventures in defense matters certainly affect U.S. -U.K.
relations, economic considerations rather than the
Anglo-American special relationship seemed to determine the
ultimate decision to buy Trident. The French had intimated
that they would have welcomed a bid for their M-4 missile
[Ref. 2:p. 1143. A number of British politicians and
academics were arguing at the time that Anglo-American
nuclear co-operation was an enduring political liability in
Britain's relations with Europe and that it was time for
Britain to demonstrate European credentials and renounce
furti-ier dependence upon the Americans [Ref. 2:p. 1141. Had
the French missile been comparable to Trident in cost,
delivery time, and technology the British may very well have
decided to buy European. But the cost-effectiveness of the
American system outweighed these political concerns and was
the basis of the Conservative defense argument for the
Trident weapon system.
Some have contended that the special relationship in
the early 198Cs was partly the result of deteriorating
East-Vest relstions and partly the result of viewpoints
shared between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Each
regarded the other as an important ally in a campaign to
improve Western defenses. The favorable terms offered the
British in the agreements may have been an American response
to Prime Minister Thatcher's strong support for cruise
missile deployments in Europe in the face of large scale
opposition. Some have speculated that, through the promise
of extra jobs and fixed research and development, Reagan may
have been trying to ease domestic pressures on the
Conservatives, who were facing high unemployment and protest
movements. CRef. 38:p. 185]
No doubt the British have a great deal of confidence
in American co-operat i veness now and in the future and will
probably use it to reduce their costs--as with, for example.
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the arrangement to refurbish British missiles at King's Bay,
Georgia. However, they are sensitive to any insinuation
that the special relationship (including strategic weapon
system procurement and joint targeting planning at Omaha)
somehow reduces the independence of their strategic nuclear
force. Independence is based on the following
considerations: the submarines and warheads are designed,
built, and overhauled in the United Kingdom; the British
have the capability to change targeting if they so desire;
and only the British government has release authority over
the weapons. It is a firmly held belief that the
Anglo-American co-operation has substantial cost benefits
but in no way compromises the independence of the British
strategic nuclear forces. The Trident agreements of 1980
and 1982 reaffirmed the special defense relationship in that
both sides agreed on the importance of maintaining an
independent nuclear deterrent, on remaining committed to the
NATO military structure, on upgrading the Alliance's
defenses, and on relying on nuclear weapons as the basis of
deterrence. The fact that a new "Nassau Agreement"
sustaining the nuclear relationship was possible signified
that the continuing intimate partnership between the two
countries was al ive and we 1 1 .
2. Franco-American Relations
In stark contrast to Britain's reliance on the
United States for its strategic weapon systems, the French
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nuclear force modernization programs developed within a
context of (and continue to be) a demonstration of a
rejection of arrangements that suggest a subordination to
U.S. decisions or an encroachment upon French sovereignty.
Given the long history of U.S. efforts to block French
nuclear weapons programs and French efforts to maintain the
nation's independence and freedom from superpower
constraints, it is not surprising to find little
Franco-American co-operation with respect to nuclear
modern : zat i or programs, since French independence and rank
as a great power hinge in part on France's autonomous
nuclear accomplishments. Any major French-American nuclear
co-operation might significantly erode this linchpin of
French domestic and international politics, if it implied
that France v.'as not a fully equal partner. The only direct
French-American co-operation uncovered by this research with
respect 'to French nuclear force modernization efforts was
the U.S. Defense Department's approval of the sale of
Pnci«-weM Collins VLF transmitters in support of the Astarte
airborne communications relay [Ref. 115:p. 201.
In the summer 1989 issue of Fore i qn Pol i cv magazine,
Richard H. Ullman of Princeton alleged that in a highly
secret arrangement the United States has provided
substantial assistance for much of the last 15 years to the
French nuclear weapons program; Washington supposedly
furnished France with information on how to design and build
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nuclear weapons and deliver them by missiles and aircraft
[Ref. 116:pp. 3-333. "The French sought and received advice
on miniaturizing their warheads and on shielding them from
electromagnetic radiation generated by nearby nuclear
explosions." [Ref. 116:p. 13] To circumvent U.S. law
prohibiting such transfer of technical information, Ul Iman
wrote, a technique of "negative guidance" was used [Ref.
116:p. 103. He also wrote that France and the United States
have exchanged nuclear targeting data [Ref. 116:pp. 24-27].
The article prompted a French Ministry of Defense communique
on 28 May 1989 which acknowledged, "Exchanges of technical
information in the nuclear sphere take p 1 ace ... between
France and the United States principally in the areas of
security and safety," [Ref. 117:p. 11 Such exchanges, it
stated, were permitted by unclassified agreements reached in
1961 and amended in 1985. The 1985 agreement was in fact
reported in Le Monde on 4-5 August 1985 as permitting
co-operation and information exchange regarding safety and
security but not transfer of weapons, components, or nuclear
materials TRef. 118:p. 4]. The 28 May 1989 communique
reaffirmed France's non-dependence on foreign technologies
and components and added, "France builds up an independent
nuclear deterrent with her own means." [Ref. 117:p, 13
Some assert that any French efforts to maintain a
credible deterrent must imply an indirect Franco-American
co-operation. Despite the improvements in the French
nuclear arsenal, its credibility depends upon a tacit de
facto linkage with the enormous striking power of U.S.
nuclear forces. The American forces have been described as
a force multiplier for the French forces. Since the French
obviously can not hope to compete on the same level as the
Soviets, the concept of the weak deterring the strong should
be understood as the strong augmented by the weak deterring
the strong. [Ref. 66:p. 83] The French strategy of
proportional deterrence, that is the capability to inflict
damage greater than the value to the Soviets of destroying
France, rests on the Soviet recognition that the French
might do enough damage and weaken the Soviet state enough to
allow the U.S. to dominate the war- termi nat i on process [Ref.
1 I9:p. 13]
.
Nc^ethe 1 ess , the French vehemently deny any
suggestion or insinuation that their nuclear weapons,
nuclear 'defense strategy, and nuclear weapons targeting are
the result of any co-operation with foreign allies, direct
or indirect. Too much investment, both poHtical and
monetary, have gone into developing and maintaining an
independent nuclear force for the concept of independence to




V. ANALYTICAL COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS
One might initially expect the current British and
French strategic nuclear force modernization programs to be
similar for several reasons. First, they are both products
of West European medium-sized powers of comparable size,
population, and geographic location. Second, the ultimate
purpose of both nations'' nuclear forces is the preservation
of their national identities and independence and the
protection of their respective vital national interests.
With such fundamentals in common one might anticipate
similar rationales for strategic nuclear modernization,
analogous force structures, and comparable strategic nuclear
doctrine and targeting criteria. Working from those
assumptions the fundamental goal of the thesis was to
investigate through a symmetrical framework of comparative
analysis the strategic nuclear force modernization programs
of these two West European democracies.
Research quickly revealed that the differences in the
two nations' modernization efforts were more significant and
revealing than their similarities. The basic outline for
the thesis was revised several times because a strictly
symmetrical comparison between British and French strategic
nuclear doctrine and their force structures was found to be
inappropriate; in some cases the initially hypothesized
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symmetry was simply nonexistent. Nonetheless, the original
comparative framework was maintained. The awkwardness in
the symmetrical comparative analysis was the result of an
effort to force into the same artificial framework for
analysis two unique nuclear force structures and associated
doctrines. The difficulty in maintaining a hypothesis of
symmetry in the British and French nuclear modernization
programs within the analysis, however, is itself conclusive.
Although Britain and France designed and developed their
strategic nuclear weapon systems and modernization programs
within the same generally polarized East-West international
environment, with a common perceived threat (namely, the
Soviet Union), and with similar resources, each nation's
resultant programs, strategies, and doctrine exhibits unique
features. These features appear to be determined to a large
degree by each nation's domestic political traditions and
national .historical experiences.
A. SIMILARITIES
There are, nonetheless, significant similarities in the
two nations' nuclear arsenals. For the most part, both
nations' nuclear arsenals are seen as the ultimate
guarantors of national sovereignty. Both nations hold that
their strategic nuclear arsenals represent enough credible
destructive power to dissuade a potential aggressor from
initiating direct attacks against the United Kingdom or
France. The French have been more explicit than the British
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regarding this rationale in tlneir doctrine of
" sanctuar i sat i on " of the French homeland. Nonetheless, the
same rationale is evident in British arguments that Trident
represents a last resort national nuclear force should
Britain have to stand alone in her defense.
Although both countries rely on the capability to
inflict massive destruction, expressed as an anti-cities
targeting strategy in the case of France and as the "key
aspects of Soviet state power" target base in the case of
the United Kingdom, neither finds the credibility of its
strategic nuclear deterrent forces dependent upon a
criterion of mutual assured destruction. The ability only
to maim partially an adversary is deemed sufficient for
deterrence. The British hold that their strategic nuclear
forces, even with Trident, meet this minimum deterrence
level without fueling the nuclear "arms race". Similarly,
the French maintain that their modernization programs will
ensure that French nuclear forces meet their definition of
minimum si.jf f i c i ency for proportional deterrence. This
approach to deterrence relies upon the assumption that the
aggressor would have to consider the risk of being fatally
weakened v i s-a-v i s his other potential adversaries. Hence,
the credibility of the proportional or minimal deterrence
argument for both Britain and France relies to a large
extent on superpower rivalry and confrontation and U.S.
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capabilities *c ceter aggress. c~ arc, if necessary, to
dcrtinate escslit.c: aid :.-.e var termination process.
Bctr 3r.ta:n arc France have clearly alluded to the
Soviet Un . c- as :ne principal threat to their security and
that of Western E;-rc?e as a whole. Although the French were
not explicit in identifying the Soviet Union as the threat
until 1083, coth nuclear arsenals and associated
modernization programs were clearly designed and targeted
against the Soviet Union. In the case of Britain, the
Cheva'ine W5r;'-ead syster. and Trident II D-5 oallistic
missile systerr. were se ected because of their assessed
abiMty to penetrate Soviet ant : -bal 1 i st : c mssile defenses.
The British have made it clear that their objective is to be
aiii'ie to hold at risk Moscow and 'key aspects of Scv.et state
power .
"
Similarly, French investments and continued emphas.s on
modernization of the submarine nuclear forces and
deve'c?-e-t cf tne advanced y-A, ^:-45, and Y.-S SlBMs with
soph .=*. cat ed per^et r at : c. a . ds reflect 8>:tens:ve efforts to
def«»at perceived developments in the .Moscow ABM defenses.
The decres^sed rel.ance by the French on the manned
penetrating bomber elem.ent of the French triad through the
phasing out of the Mirage IV-? -n the m.id-l^PQs may be seen
as a trioute to the Scv.et air defense network, although the
Frencn nave ret r-leo ct developing long-range air-launched
m.S5. =- r": '- '-r -," rf t'-:e century. The enlarged
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anti-cities strategy of targeting the infrastructure of
Soviet administrative control as well as industrial and
economic assets has been seen as a French decision to
respond to Soviet civj^ defense programs. It is clear that
both the British and French strategic nuclear force
modernization programs were designed against a specific
perceived threat from the East--name 1 y , the Soviet Union.
To enhance their doctrines of minimal deterrence, both
countries have advanced deliberately ambiguous policy
articulations and have emphasized the uncertainties and
i nca 1 cu 1 abi 1 i t y facing a potential aggressor. Hence, the
British stress the contribution to deterrence that the
British strategic nuclear forces offer by providing a
second center of nuclear decision-making; the French remain
v^gue regarding the definition of France^s vital interests.
The British and French declare that there is no uncertainty
in their will to use nuclear weapons, but both nations''
leaders apparently believe that specifying with any degree
of precision the conditions under which their nuclpar forces
would be uspd would undermine their deterrent value.
Both British and French policy-makers have viewed
possession of nuclear weapons as a means to achieve a sort
of great power status. Continued possession of a modern
strategic nuclear arsenal is seen as a way to maintain
membership in an elite "club" of international players which
ensures; inclusion and participation in European and world
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security matters. This perception that great power status
and nuclear weapons are integrally related leads to the next
cone 1 us J on
.
Both British and French nuclear forces were planned and
procured under the assumption that nuclear weapons have
served a useful and "legitimate" role in maintaining peace
and security in Europe. The function of nuclear forces as
the linchpin of French defense programs, policies, and
strategy and the continued extensive efforts to modernize
those force? clearly reflect decisions of the French
leadership based upon the expected continued efficacy of
nuclear weapons as valid instruments of policy in
international relations. The British decision to modernize
their str-rtegic nuclear force with the Trident program
rather than to abandon it altogether reflects a similar
assumption that nuclear weapons will continue to function as
a credible deterrent to aggression even in an uncertain
future.
B. DIFFERENCES
It is the differences n the two nations' modernization
efforts which are more significant and revealing. The major
fundamental contrasts between British and French nuclear
programs, doctrines, and strategies are analyzed below.
British and French defense policies differ
fundamentally in their perspectives regarding allied
co-operation, especially with respect to strategic nuclear
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forces. The current. modernization programs and the
associated public announcements reconfirm those basic
differences. The French emphasize their independent
employment options; the British emphasize the commitment of
the Trident nuclear forces to NATO. The British underscore
the contribution that their strategic nuclear forces make to
the Allied deterrent posture. British policy relies on
NATO's flexible response for the earlier stages of
deterrence and defense. The French consensus, on the other
hand, includes a rejection of any arrangements that might
entail a perceived subordination of French interests to
collective ones or that might suggest a perceived
infringement upon French sovereignty. Hence, there are no
French plans to return to an integrated status in NATO and
there is no strategic nuclear targeting co-ordination.
These differing perspectives on alliance co-operation
for defense may stem in part from the two nations' recent
historical experience. Britain was able to achieve victory
in two world wars through successful alliances, whereas the
French appear to have less confidence in the efficacy of
alliance relationships. The influence of history on
post-war British and French overall defense policies is
clearly reflected in their respective doctrines concerning
nuclear weapons, the manner in which they contribute to
deterrence, and the rationale for strategic nuclear
modernization programs.
Another major difference In British and French nuclear
policies and programs is the value placed not only on
co-operation within an Alliance structure but also on
co-operation on nuclear matters with the United States. The
British, especially under Conservative leadership, highly
prize the "special relationship" with the United States in
nuclear and intelligence matters. The British forces
reflect in all ways close co-operation with the United
States in terms of targeting, spare parts, refurbishment of
the missiles, and the actual purchase of the missiles. The
British strategic nuclear modernization program may be
viewed as a continuation of British efforts to maintain the
wartime nuclear relationship with the United States.
French modernization programs apparently are not
dependent on any American co-operation. The French
leadership has denied all suggestions to the contrary.
Current French nuclear modernization efforts independent of
American co-operation may be seen as having evolved from the
experience of having been distrusted and excluded from
nuclear weapons develpment during World War II, as well as
from perceived anti-French behavior on the part of the
United States, including the U.S. failure to support France
in the 1956 Suez crisis and Defense Secretary McNamara's
opposition to French nuclear weapons programs in the 1960s.
Hence France-'s autonomous nuclear accomplishments and their
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continued improvements are necessary to ensure that France^s
political status is not threatened by either superpower.
This fundamental difference in political orientation has
generated further differences in resource allocation and
force structure. France's nuclear independence has been
expensive. The French have had to bear alone the enormous
costs of nuclear weapons research, design, testing, and
production with a relatively small mi 1 i tary- i ndustr i al
complex, whereas the British have sought cost reductions by
avoiding expensive national infrastructure investments and
by purchasing proven weapon systems. Consequently, 32
percent of the 1989 French military budget is represented by
nuclear programs [Ref. 26:p. 123. In contrast, British
Ministry of Defence estimates for 1988 stated that the
proportion of the Defence Budget which the Trident program
takes over its procurement period is less than three percent
on average with a peak expenditure estimated at six percent
[Ref. 10:p. xxix]. However, the British may have paid a
political rather than financial price for their deterrent
force in that Britain is dependent upon continued U.S.
support in order to maintain a credible nuclear capability
[Ref. 120:p. 35].
Although both the British and the French claim that
their forces contribute to deterrence by providing an
additional center of nuclear decision-making, their
attitudes differ. Even in policy statements for its
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stretegic nuc'ear rriodern i zat i on Britain continues to affirm
its confidence in American reliability, whereas France has
expressed doubts on whether the U.S. could be trusted to
honor its nuclear guarantees to Europe. For the French,
this IS a further rationale for an independent force.
As for differences in the hardware of the respective
modernization programs, Britain has chosen to modernize her
entire strategic nuclear force at once. This was due mainly
to the fact that she was facing bloc obsolescence in the
previous sing^e-leg system. France, on the other hand, in
order to avoid the possibility of a technological
breakthrough that might neutralize its strategic nuclear
forces, has tended to spread its modernization investments
over several launching systems. The British strategic
nuclear modernization program will continue to rely on a
totally submarine-based deterrent with at least one
submarine deployed at all times. The French modernization
progranr;s, though focused primarily on the submarine leg,
include several types of improved submar i ne- i aunched
ballistic missiles, continued research into a new land-based
intermediate-range ballistic missile, and deployment of an
air-launched stand off missile. Both powers have foregone
modernization of a manned penetrating bomber, giving up
flexibility in targeting and recall capability and
emphasizing instead survivable second-strike capability with
submar 1 ne- 1 aunched ballistic missiles.
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France appears to have placed a greater emphasis than
the United Kingdom on the survivability of its command,
control, and communications infrastructure. However, this
Judgment is speculative because of the lack of open
literature on British C3
^
Another significant difference in the modernization
programs is the lack of British domestic political consensus
concerning nuclear weapons compared to that which exists in
France. Britain^s entire nuclear capability appears
vulnerable to shifts in domestic politics. Should the
Labour Party win the next election, which may take place in
1991 or 1992, a real possibility exists that the fourth
Trident submarine-'s construction would be cancelled and the
remaining British strategic nuclear deterrent forces
negotiated away in a bilateral (or multilateral) agreement.
On the other hand, except for the Communists, French
political parties appear generally to support French nuclear
policy. French politics is divided more over program
specifics, such as basing options and resource allocation
priorities. A dramatic reduction in French nuclear
capability would require fundamental changes in French
defense and security perspectives.
C. CONCLUSION
Although there are some similarities between the
British and French strategic nuclear force modernization
programs, the differences between them are fundamental and
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significant. These differences and the various factors
which have affected the modernization programs have direct
implications for these two European nuclear powers as they
face similar difficulties and uncertainties. The British
and French nuclear modernizations appear to confront several
potential common obstacles. These include public
perceptions of a dramatically lessened threat of aggression
from the U.S.S.P. (the adversary against whom the weapons
have been designed and targeted), increased domestic
political and economic pressures to reduce defense spending,
and a potential collapse of public consensus regarding the
legitimacy of nuclear weapons as symbols of international
status and as effective instruments in deterring war.
Even though both nations' nuclear modernization
programs face common potential problems, the two countries
are likely to react according to their own national
perspect "i ves in dealing with nuclear weapons issues in the
future. For example, the two nations may well take somewhat
different; approaches with regard to arms control and nuclear
co-operation in Western Europe. Each nation has invested so
much politically, militarily, and economically in its
nuclear policies and programs that it seems highly unlikely
that either will be willing to compromise on their
fundamental features to create a common European nuclear
force, unless the incentives to do so are truly imperative.
Of course, thesp are questions for additional research
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beyond the scope of this thesis. But given the different
developments of nuclear programs and doctrine in Britain and
France in their past efforts, the defense planner must not
assume that the two powers will behave similarly as regards
their future strategic nuclear forces.
It appears that with the rapid sequence of events of
late 1^89 in Central and Eastern Europe, including the
collapse of several East European Communist regimes, the
opening of the inter-German borders, and the crumbling of
the Berlin Wall, both as a physical barrier and as a symbol
of East-West Cold War division, a fundamental reassessment
of the role of nuclear weapons with respect to Allied and
international security issues must be undertaken. The
current British and French strategic nuclear modernization
programs and their associated doctrines will inevitably be
affected. The specific hardware systems, strategic
doctrines, force mix, and possibly their entire
reason-f or-be 1 ng are likely to be questioned by some West
European defense experts and political elites. The two West
European nuclear forces will nonetheless remain important
elements in the calculation of the political and strategic
balance of power and security in Europe. Therefore, the
roles, missions, and capabilities of these modernized
nuclear forces (as well as the factors that have affected
and continue to influence them) remain important
considerations for the defense planner.
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